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China

Studies of Local Area Problems

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Studies of Local Area Problems

Ramifications of Changing Relationship Between Central, Local Governments

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[Article by Wang Huning 3769 3337 1380]

[Text] The reform of China's economic system and the reform of its political system are changing the relationship between the central and local governments. The general trend in this change is a dual process: expansion of the local government's functions and contraction of the central government's functions. The big impetus to transfer power to the lower level created by China's reforms is inseparable from the goals of these reforms. The goals are to change the highly centralized economic management system and the highly centralized political-administrative system, so that the economic life and the political life of society are filled with vitality. Thus, the expansion of local jurisdiction is an inevitable demand of the reforms. There are, of course, manifold reasons for the expansion of the functions of local government. Some of them are the plans consciously formulated by people to transfer power to the lower level, and others are the factors produced during the actual process that are not affected by man's will. In today's China, people have reached a common understanding: Changing the old pattern in the relationship between the central government and the local government is the only way that an economic system and a political system can be formed that meet the need for modernized development.

China's reforms basically take economic development as their central axis. Under the impetus of economic development, the political system is gradually being incorporated into the reform plans. Although the reform of the political system has its own cause, at the present stage its basic motivating force stems from the reform of the economic system. Viewed from the macro angle of society, this change is a development from a politically mobilized model of society to an economically mobilized model of society¹. Even if the change now being made in the relationship between China's central government and local government mainly originated in the economic realm, it possesses a political significance that cannot be underestimated, and it has led to a major conflict with the political system. In their study of the development of contemporary society in China, some scholars have noted this point. For example, Dorothy J. Solinger thinks that there is political significance in giving power to economic departments and large economic zones, to industrial departments, and to provinces and industrial cities, and in transferring to the lower level the power to distribute funds and materials². This article is a search, amid the reform of the economic system and the development of the economy, for the basic cause of the transfer of power to the lower level. It then goes on to investigate the political results that could

be produced by this change, as well as the effect of the expansion of the local government's functions on China's economic and political life.

1. An important characteristic of a socialist country is the integration into an organic whole of the political system and the economic system. The goal of the reforms is to separate appropriately the political system and the economic system. Economic laws would be used to readjust the economic life of society, and would not use administrative measures to separate the government and the enterprise. Thus, the enterprise would be allowed to become an independent economic entity. The reforms are now only in the transitional stage toward the above-mentioned ideal state, and it cannot be said that the blueprint for the reforms has already been drawn up. In principle, the basic task of the system that integrates politics and economics into one integrated whole is to redistribute resources so as to satisfy the interests and demands of society. For a long time China's political system redistributed resources in a highly centralized manner and brought into line all the interests and demands. Even if from 1949 to 1978 there was this or that change in the form of the redistribution of resources, no fundamental change occurred in the pattern of highly centralized redistribution. There were many causes of this phenomenon, the main ones being: (1) After the revolution the rigorous political task faced by China's leadership stratum was the establishment and consolidation of the new political regime, the expansion of the social foundation for the new regime, and the organization of the reconstruction of society³. (2) The deficiency in society's resources meant that society could not create mechanisms for redistributing resources that were perfected in self-regulation. It had to use unified, centralized means of distributing the limited resources, so as to satisfy, as much as possible, society's own interests and demands, balance the relationship among all regions, and promote the balanced development of every region. (3) There was the "exemplary" role of the Soviet models. Since 1949 China has basically copied the Soviet models of the political system and the economic system by using highly centralized state power to redistribute resources, manage society, and direct economic activity. Toward the end of the fifties (1957) and in the mid-sixties (1965), the Soviet Union readjusted its economic system⁴, but for various reasons, especially in the ideological field, China did not learn a lesson from the Soviet Union's readjustment. (4) There was the continuation of the military leadership system of the war years. China's socialist system was established through the medium of revolutionary war. During long periods of military activity, an integrated system of command was formed from top to bottom. After the socialist system was established, the implementation of political leadership basically needed to depend on this system of command. Military command requires a highly centralized system. The personnel affairs, mode of operation, and other aspects of this system constitute a "model." At that time it would have been unrealistic to think of suddenly adopting a different model in peacetime. In addition, for other

reasons the power to redistribute resources was concentrated in the central government and the local government had very little jurisdiction. The local government was not even conscious of local interests and demands. Because the central government represented the interests of the entire society, the basic function of the local government was only to satisfy a part of society's interests. The system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests settled the pattern for the relationship between the central government and the local government. It determined that the central government had overwhelming power of command over the local government. Generally speaking, this system was unfavorable for the display of local initiative and creativity.

The system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests had its foundation in the overall plan, and it was a highly centralized system of an ordered nature. The overall plan included the main aspects of all economic activity. The integrated planning system comprised plans in four aspects: production, circulation, distribution, and consumption. It was specifically related to national revenue, agricultural production, industrial production, the construction industry, communication and transportation, the means of production, foreign trade, urban public facilities, distribution of national revenue, wages for labor, and prices. Through this integrated network the central government decided what the local government would do, and the local government in reality became the executor of the central plan.

In the period before 1978 there were many readjustments in the basic pattern of the relationship between the central government and the local government.⁵ There were many cases of centralization and decentralization of power, the principal ones being the undulations of the "two releases and two takeovers." The first undulation occurred in the fifties. At the time of the First 5-Year Plan, the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests began to take shape. In 1954 six major regions were done away with. The principal industrial enterprises under the direct supervision of the central ministries and the enterprises under the direct supervision of the central authorities increased from 2,800 in 1953 to 9,300 in 1957. Centralization of power was enhanced in plans, capital construction, wages, financial and tax revenue, and management of materials and commodity prices. The kinds of materials distributed by the state in a unified manner increased from 227 to 532; and the gross output value of industrial products managed by the State Planning Commission accounted for about 60 percent of that of the entire country and for 75 percent of the central government's allocated financial resources⁶. [no reference in text to Footnote 5] This was suitable for the level of economic development and the state of the economic structure at that time. However, the highly centralized system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests exerted too much

and too strict control over the localities. The localities had very little financial power, and it was impossible for them to get things moving. In 1957 there was the beginning of the readjustment to expand the powers of the localities and the enterprises. Management of enterprises under the central authorities was transferred to the localities. Planning and management jurisdiction was transferred to the lower level, as was the jurisdiction over the examination and approval of capital construction and the jurisdiction over financial and tax revenue. There were only 1,075 enterprises directly managed by the central authorities, an 88.4 percent reduction compared with the figure at the beginning of 1957. There were 132 kinds of materials distributed in a unified manner by the central authorities, a 75 percent reduction compared with the figure at the beginning of 1957; and the financial resources allocated by the central authorities only accounted for 20 percent of the total budget⁷. Although the downward transfer of power played a role in arousing local initiative and developing local industry, its range was too large and its speed too fast. Society's economic and political mechanisms could not adapt right away. The necessary unity was destroyed, causing a state of blindness and anarchy in production and construction. The consequences were serious.

The second undulation occurred in the sixties and seventies. Because the downward transfer of power in the fifties had produced negative results, the relationship between the central government and the local government was readjusted once again. Emphasis was put on unified leadership and centralization of state power. To a certain degree it was a reinstatement of the centralized system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests. In 1965 the number of enterprises directly under the central authorities reached 10,503, and their output value accounted for 42.3 percent of the gross output value of industry. There were 502 kinds of materials distributed in a unified manner and managed by ministries. A system of materials management and a network of business administration, in which there was direct leadership from the central authorities to the localities, was set up, and the 60 percent of the financial resources were allocated by the central authorities. During the "great cultural revolution," under the ideological guidance of pursuing unique local systems and of creating "industrial provinces," there was another downward transfer of power. From 1969 on, large-scale enterprises, including the Anshan Iron and Steel Company and the Daqing Oilfield, were transferred to the localities for management. A system of large-scale responsibility for materials and finances was also tried out in order to expand the locality's power over materials, finances, investment, planning and management. In 1976 there were only 1,674 enterprises directly under the central authorities, and their output value was only 6 percent of the gross output value of industry. Although these measures aroused the initiative of the localities, a phenomenon took shape in which the regions were separated and the departments were separated, and in turn it gave rise to the phenomena of blindness in

production and duplication of construction and to confusion in management⁸. From the political viewpoint, because during the "great cultural revolution" political power was highly centralized and participation in politics was made compulsory, although the policy of transferring power from the top levels to the lower levels did change the relationship between the central government and the local government, it actually increased the social and economic responsibilities of the local government and added to its tasks. The local government's functions in the noneconomic field expanded markedly.

Generally speaking, during the 30-year period before the current reforms, changes occurred slowly in the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, and the functions of the local government were constantly being expanded. This evolutionary process conformed to the trend in social and economic development. Actually, in a country that has in large part a system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, there will be real progress in transferring more or less power downward. However, for various reasons this was not the case in China, and consequently there was very little change in the relationship between the central government and the local government. Moreover, from a look at the range in which power was transferred downward we see that the policies of the past in general only related to economic power and did not relate to economic planning and resource distribution. Power in this field was still held by the central government. In plan formulation, materials supply, investment distribution, and revenue, the expansion of the local government's jurisdiction made slow progress. However, the pattern of centralization of state power was not considered a fundamental problem of the entire system. What was given more consideration was the enhancement of the initiative of the local government and the elimination of the pressure on the local government caused by the imbalance in local economic development. It was noteworthy that in the readjustment of the relationship between the central and local government, the central government remained dominant. In reality, it was the central government that took the initiative to transfer power downward, and the local government was put in a passive position.

There were various reasons for the fact that the system of combining highly centralized distribution of resources with satisfaction of interests was slow to change and was not large in scope. The main reasons were: (1) For a long time the deficiency in resources baffled people. The resources possessed by governments at all levels were insufficient to satisfy all kinds of social needs. The central government had to concentrate its limited resources on accelerating the pace of building the national economy. (2) For a long time the political system did not make economic development its central task, and in the main it engaged in political movements. Especially during the "great cultural revolution" the many contradictions and demands engendered in the

economic mechanisms were overlooked, and these pressures were not transformed into a motivating force for change. (3) The economic and political pressures on the local government were insufficient to make it take the initiative in the downward transfer of power. In reality, the pressure on the local government was mainly pressure from the central government, and not pressure from the social and economic life of the locality itself. There was no clear realization of the local government's role in taking the initiative. (4) The highly centralized power of the state in political life restricted the expansion of the functions of the local government, and this expansion lacked political support. The local government was still subordinate to the leadership of the highly centralized power of the state, and the expansion of its power in economic and social life did not have much political significance.

2. After 1978 a high-speed reform began in the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests. The immature conditions mentioned above gradually matured, and the expansion of the functions of the local government became a trend that was difficult to stop. There were two reasons for the large-scale transformation of the traditional system after 1978. One reason was that a summation was made of all previous efforts to readjust the relationship between the central government and the local government, and this summation made use of rational knowledge. The reforms of the past had mainly been concentrated on how to differentiate the powers of the central government and the local government. They did not pay attention to the relationship between the government and the enterprise. They made the enterprise an appendage of the administrative system, which meant that in the pattern of transferring power to the lower level the necessary social and economic conditions were lacking. At the same time the reforms of the past were mainly readjustments of administrative jurisdiction, and they did not take into account the internal mechanisms of economic life. There were more factors that transcended economics than there were economic factors. Economic organizations, economic levers, and economic laws did not play their indispensable role in the reforms. In discussing the reform of the economic system, people now acknowledge that the fundamental problem in China's old system was the relationship between the state and the enterprise⁹. In essence this is the view that the fundamental problem in China's old system was not the differentiation of the jurisdictions of the central government and the local government, but whether the enterprise could truly become an economic entity. The enterprise was managed by administrative organizations. It did not have a relatively independent position, and it did not have the power to conduct business on its own initiative. Understanding of this point led to the beginning of the reform of the urban economic system. It first began with the invigoration of the enterprise and then, drawing on this invigoration, plans of an instructional

nature were changed into plans that combined instruction with guidance; making the macro reform of changing to a planned commodity economy.

In a second aspect, proceeding from the abovementioned rational knowledge, people discussed the empirical knowledge about the political and economic mechanisms. To a great degree, the relationship between the central government and the local government was a relationship between the "trunk" and the "branch." The management method of "trunk" and "branch" began to take shape in the fifties, and the relationship between "trunk" and "branch" was the "main shaft" in the relationship between the central government and the local government. The separation of "branch" and "branch" was a major malpractice in the system of the past. Taking as its basis the administrative systems of the central government, "trunk and branch" management cut the intrinsic coherence of economic life. The separation of "trunk and branch" was unfavorable to specialized coordination and socialized large-scale production, to the comprehensive utilization of resources, and to technological progress. Therefore, to invigorate the enterprise there had to be a breaking away from the practice of separating "trunk and branch" and there had to be a promotion of the development of the natural connections of economic life.

On the basis of understanding these two points, people carried out two series of reforms in the economic domain.

First, they streamlined government administration and transferred power, expanding the enterprise's right to act on its own initiative and increasing its capability for self-development. Through this reform the enterprises in the system of ownership by the whole people now possessed the following rights to act on their own initiative: (1) the right to plan production. All enterprises with an instructed plan from the state could, under the premise of fulfilling the state plan, formulate a production and business plan in line with market needs. (2) the right to buy and sell products. The reform changed the situation in which raw materials had to go through the state's materials system in order to be allocated and transferred, and in which products could only be purchased in a unified manner from materials departments or commercial wholesale organizations. In line with market needs, an enterprise could directly make purchases on the market or directly organize raw materials in the production area. After it fulfilled the state plan, the sale of the enterprise's products could be directly promoted on the market. (3) the right to set prices. Formerly, an enterprise did not have this right, and the price of a product could not reflect the rise or fall in the product's cost or the superiority or inferiority of the product's quality. After the reform the enterprise had a certain right to set prices. It could either set the price itself or negotiate the price. (4) the right to use funds. The state had controlled the revenue from and the expenditure on the enterprise's property, and all of the

enterprise's profit was turned over to the higher authorities. With the reform of the state's financial administration, the enterprise retained 3.7 percent of its profit. In 1986 this figure rose to 42 percent (after deducting the adjusted tax, communication and energy fee, urban construction fee, and educational surcharge, the actual amount of profit retained was about 20 percent). At the same time the practice of handing over all of the depreciation fund to the state was changed. In 1978, of this fund 20 percent was turned over to the state; the local responsible bureau got 20 percent and the enterprise 30 percent. By a later change 70 percent was left with the enterprise and 30 percent was used by the local responsible bureau. Now, the entire depreciation fund stays with the enterprise. (5) the right to distribute wages and bonuses. The state had set wages and bonuses in a centralized manner. They are now linked to the enterprise's profit. In general, for every 1 percent rise in profit, wages and bonuses are permitted to rise 0.3 to 0.7 percent. (6) the right to make lateral economic connections. The enterprise can cut across industries, regions, and systems of ownership in order to make connections and engage in the coordination of funds, technologies, and production and in the exchange of talents. (7) the right to obtain working personnel. The enterprise can openly recruit workers from society¹⁰. Good conditions have been created for the enterprise by the transfer of these jurisdictions. For the enterprise to be able to take complete advantage of these conditions, it needs to be provided with external conditions. However, the external conditions are not all that mature, and the contradiction herein has become an important reason for the current expansion of the local government's functions.

Next, the readjustment of the "trunk" has weakened the "trunk" system: (1) The distribution of funds has been readjusted. The centrally directed plan reduces its distribution of the kinds of materials and raw materials from 256 to 26, and reduces the kinds of products it distributes from 120 to 60. (2) The right to make strategic decisions on investment has been transferred to the lower level, and the system of central and local finances being "cooked on separate stoves and eaten separately" has been put into practice. The central authorities have transferred to the lower level the right to make strategic decisions on investment. For example, the funds quota for the construction projects of a productive nature and for the technological transformation projects that have been examined and approved by the State Planning Commission has now been raised to 30 million yuan; in principle, each province or city itself examines and approves construction projects of a nonproductive nature¹¹. In 1985 the sum total of investment in the fixed assets of the entire society was 254.318 billion yuan, and the investment in the state budget was only 44.883 billion yuan¹². The policies of relaxing control over the enterprise, reducing production indices of an instructed nature, and turning profit into taxes have caused the central government to withdraw its direct intervention in the enterprise. At the same time the

central authorities have handed over the direct management of the enterprise to the locality, and by far the greater part of the enterprises are managed by local governments. In 1985, of the more than 400,000 industrial enterprises in the entire country, about 1 percent were managed by the central authorities¹³. In reality, by far the greater part of them are controlled by the local governments. With the addition of some other reforms, the jurisdiction of the "trunk" has been greatly reduced.

The direct result of this dual process was a cutback in the central government's functions. In the process itself there was no conscious plan to expand the local government's functions. However, the result of the actual movement of the process was the expansion of these functions and even their "inflation." After the reform, the role of the local government became increasingly highlighted. The main cause of this phenomenon was that there was no suitable external environment for the enterprise's activity. With the enterprise being unable to utilize fully the powers given to it, the local government undertook the task of creating and improving the functions of the enterprise affected by external conditions. The original idea of the reform was to transfer power to the enterprise and thus invigorate it. However, what was needed for the enterprise to fully utilize the power were good mechanisms of economic motion, good domestic market conditions, and ample sources of natural resources, as well as various other conditions. If the enterprise does not have these things, it will be impossible for the enterprise to act with facility. The actual situation now facing the enterprise is that the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests has already been weakened and a new system is in the process of formation. The market mechanisms are very imperfect, and the enterprise cannot but depend on the coordination and help of the local government. The local government relies on the local enterprise for its financial revenue and other things, so it has to take on these responsibilities. The result of the transfer of power to the enterprise was to facilitate the expansion of the local government's functions. The main manifestations of the local government's activity in this respect are: (1) To a very great degree the local government has taken on the function of allocation for its own area and for the area just beyond it. The local government enjoys a certain right to make distributions according to plan and a certain right to distribute materials and products outside the plan. The local government can, through the exchange of materials, coordinated trade, alliances, and other forms of activity, get from outside the materials supply system the means of production to satisfy the demands of the local enterprise. In 1985, the total amount of materials purchased outside the system accounted for 57 percent of the total amount of materials purchased¹⁴. (2) The local government has become an important investor, and it has a certain right to examine and approve investments. It has the right to exercise actual control over the enterprise, local financial and tax revenue, and the bank; it can, directly or indirectly, intervene in investment activity. (3) The local

government has a certain right to manage the enterprise, and it can, through the exercise of its power, control the activity of the enterprise¹⁵. As a result, in the dual process of transferring power to the enterprise and weakening the jurisdiction of the "trunk," the functions of the local government have been expanded. This seemed, unfortunately, to be an unexpected result. What is changing now is not the relationship between the state and the enterprise but rather the relationship between the central government and the local government. Proceeding from the tentative idea for the reform of the economic system, what mainly needs to be changed is the dependent position of the enterprise, thereby invigorating it; the actual movement of the mechanism would cause an unprecedented invigoration of the local governments

There are two main reasons for the expansion of the local government's function. One is that China is a country in which the economy is not developed, the productive forces are backward, and the resources are deficient. Under the system of highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, the central government demands that the local government play a certain role in resource distribution, economic command, and economic regulation. For a long time the functions of the local government and the functions of the local economy were united, and the local enterprise was dependent on the local government. After the reform the functions of the local government continued as before. Between the central government and the enterprise there was a kind of "weaning," but the local government increased its "breast feeding." When the new system was taking over from the old, the central government demanded that the local government take on the function of coordination. The other reason was that, after the central government transferred power, because the ideal pattern could not take shape immediately, the market system was imperfect, the supply of materials and fuel was not assured, and the channels and networks for selling products were not stable. Therefore, the local government had to intervene in order to insure the survival and development of the enterprise and at the same time to work for the local interests. Sound market mechanisms cannot be brought into being in a short time, and so the expansion of the functions of the local government could be a long-term trend.

To a certain degree, the expansion of the local government's functions has changed the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests into a divided power-type system. The local government is playing a bigger and bigger role in the planning, materials, commercial, and financial systems. This pattern of reform has caused functions of the local government to expand and the functions of the central government to shrink. This change in relationship is not only economically significant but also politically significant. Its political significance will be given full expression when the divided power-type system reaches a certain stage.

3. The above analysis shows that the reform of the economic system that has taken place in recent years has caused changes in the traditional system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests. Formerly the local government passed on to the central government all resources, after which the central government redistributed them to satisfy the interests of all areas. Now the fundamental part of the new system is that the central government has narrowed the range of its redistribution of resources, and it is necessary for the local government to redistribute resources and satisfy interests at its lower level. Although still in the process of developing, the divided power-style system for redistributing resources is effectively changing the relationship between the central government and the local government.

China is a single-system country, and the local governments at the provincial and city levels are controlled by the central government in a unified manner. China's political system is a highly organic system. However, looking at the development of the economy and the society, we see that there are all kinds of differences in development between areas and these differences are large. The main manifestations of these differences are: (1) the size of the jurisdiction of local governments varies. For example, statistics for 1985 show that Sichuan County had 175 county-level units and Hebei Province had 137, but Qinghai Province had only 37 and Jilin Province had only 35. (2) There are wide gaps in the level of social and economic development between areas. According to statistics for 1984, Shanghai's gross value of social output was 87.638 billion yuan, Jiangsu Province's was 117.334 billion yuan, and Shandong Province's was 101.464 billion yuan; but Guangxi Autonomous Region's was only 25.861 billion yuan, Guizhou Province's was only 17.988 billion yuan, and Qinghai Province's was only 4.402 billion yuan, and so forth (see *China Economic Statistics Almanac*, 1986). Under the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, these differences are reconciled by the central government by means of having the provinces with higher gross value of social output support those with lower ones. However, under the divided-power system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, the provinces with higher gross value of social output will naturally give more consideration to their own local interests. (3) The distribution of resources is extremely uneven. For example, Shandong Province and the Nei Mongol Autonomous Region together have 61.3 percent of the total coal reserves, but the coal-deficient provinces south of the Changjiang River have only 1.4 percent. Heilongjiang Province has 54.8 percent of the workable reserves in proven oilfields; 70 percent of the natural gas reserves are concentrated in the Sichuan Basin; water power resources are concentrated in the southwestern region, where they account for 70 percent of the country's total; and large mining areas with more than several billion tons of reserves are mainly concentrated in Liaoning, Sichuan, and Hebei Provinces¹⁶. Once the

divided power-type system combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests is put into practice, control of resources will become an important force. Actually, the movement in China's existing mechanisms causes many problems of the noneconomic control of resources, and at a critical time "regional blockades" will be formed. The results that these differences could bring are bound to be fully manifested under the divided power-type system. They will constitute problems in the movement of the economy that must be solved. At the same time they will become new tasks for political coordination. Two developments are enhancing this trend. One is the localization of interests. In the past the central government coordinated in a unified fashion the interests of all areas. The interests were, in reality, centralized. The central government redistributed resources; the local government implemented the central plan and tasks, and the interests of its own locality were not strong. However, after the reform of the system, the local government had to assume the responsibility for satisfying local interests. The central government also handed over to the local government the great majority of the duties of this kind. On one hand, this was favorable for the display by the local government of its initiative. On the other hand, the local government had to give more consideration to local interests. In many respects the development of local interests was promoted. For example, local developments determined whether the locality could fulfill the central plan, determined the administrative achievements of the local government, determined whether the local government could meet to a greater degree the demands of the masses of people in the locality, determined the level of prestige of the local government, and so forth. Therefore, in the system in today's China the trend toward the localization of interests is becoming more and more clear, and it has become a motivating force for the system in which the local government takes the initiative. There is a local division of power in the redistribution of resources and the satisfaction of interests. On this point there is a difference with the transfer of power to the lower level of the past.

Second, there is the pluralization of interests. In today's China economics is the focus of work. The ongoing modernization and the exemplary role of the modern world cause more interests and demands to sprout among the people. In quantity and quality, these interests and demands far surpass the levels of the past. At the same time, the many economic and social problems that have been accumulating for a long time are gradually being intensified. These problems, for example, are those of the large number of people awaiting employment, the environment, housing, and traffic. The demands in these two aspects are exerting daily growing pressure on the local government and, therefore, it must give more consideration to local interests. After the reform of the system, power was released by the central government and the responsibilities of the local government became greater.

Under the impetus of these factors, the local government must do its utmost to satisfy local interests and the central government must give more consideration to local difficulties. After the reform, there was an enhanced consciousness of local interests everywhere. First, the satisfaction of local interests engendered many new kinds of problems. Shanghai, for example, has an insufficiency of materials supply and means of production. Its shortage in electric power and in raw and processed materials has adversely affected production. The output in January 1986 of the Shanghai Textile Bureau decreased by 200 million yuan, and insufficient electric power was the cause of half this amount. In the first half of 1985, the tobacco leaves supplied to Shanghai by other parts of the country were only 30 percent of the planned amount; and Shanghai had to use foreign exchange for the importation of grain, fuel, and raw and processed materials¹⁷. After the reform of the system, the proportion of the materials distributed by the state that was needed for Shanghai's production and construction fell. For example, that of coal fell from 93.9 percent in 1980 to 88 percent, that of steel products fell from 85.5 percent to 59.3 percent, that of wood fell from 84.2 percent to 73.7 percent, and that of cement fell from 42.1 percent to 16.3 percent. Prices of nonplanned commodities were very high. For example, the plan-distribution price for a ton of pig iron was 272 yuan and its market price was 523 yuan¹⁸. These problems had an adverse effect on Shanghai's economic development and revenue. The local authorities, of course, encountered many difficulties in satisfying local interests. Faced with these problems, the local government of course responded to protect local interests. The first response was to cut from the top proportionally from the central government's finances. Because of the many cuts off the top, there was less revenue for the local government. It did little to ease the pressure on local interests, and there were insufficient resources for the development of the local economy.

The problem of top cuts in the proportion of revenue has become a "hot issue" in the central government and in the local government. Since 1949 the central government has, through the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, distributed the resources of all areas in a unified fashion. Where a fairly large imbalance exists, more revenue is turned over to the higher authorities. The amount of the revenue that is turned over can be 80 percent of the local total revenue, as is the case in Shanghai. Places with little revenue not only do not turn revenue over to the higher authorities, but on the contrary, they have to be subsidized by them. The amount of this subsidy can be more than half of the finances, as is the case in Qinghai Province. This procedure in the proportion of distribution has been in place for a long time. In general, the proportion of revenue turned over to the higher authorities by provinces in which the economy is fairly well developed is quite high. For example, in 1980 Shanghai's annual revenue was more than 17.9 billion yuan, accounting for 16.5 percent of the state's total revenue. In some places, after the losses of enterprises were made good, for one year there was no revenue at all and financial expenditure was completely subsidized by the

state. According to statistics for 1981, in 15 provinces and cities revenue was greater than expenditure, in two provinces they were roughly in balance, and in 12 provinces and autonomous regions revenue did not match expenditure and a subsidy from the central authorities was needed¹⁹. In the provinces where revenue was greater than expenditure, there were very large differences in the amount of revenue turned over to the higher authorities. For example, Shanghai's local revenue in 1987 was 17.291 billion yuan, the top cut for the central authorities was 11.998 billion yuan, and the local expenditure was 5.385 billion yuan; in Jiangsu Province, the local revenue was 10.7 billion yuan, the top cut was more than 6 billion yuan, and local expenditure was less than 4 billion yuan; Guangdong had a top cut of 1.4 billion yuan, and the amount of revenue it retained locally was 8 billion yuan²⁰. These differences have drawn the attention of the local government to the fact that a high top cut certainly will adversely affect its capacity to satisfy local interests; if the proportion of the top cut is lower it will have a higher capacity. Guangdong Province is generally thought to be more favored and to have a faster development in its economy²¹. Over the years Shanghai has turned over to the higher authorities an excessive amount of its revenue, a situation that has adversely affected its own development. From 1949 to 1987 Shanghai turned over to the central government a total of 400 billion yuan²². If this sum of money had been used for its own development it would not be impossible for it to have attained the level of economic development of Hong Kong, Singapore, and other newly arising regions. The difference in economic development among the provinces is, to a certain degree, being lessened after the top cut in revenue, and their economic and social development is also being affected. In addition, after the reform of the system there is a direct relationship between the size of their expenditure and the degree to which they satisfy interests. The expansion of local finances has, therefore, become an important goal of the local government. There are two ways that it can do this: one is the development of the economy; the other is the revision of the proportion of revenue turned over to the higher authorities. The latter involves the relationship between the central government and the local government.

Take Shanghai, for example. In recent years it has experienced a "financial slide" in which revenue has decreased year by year. In 1986 it was 17.61 billion yuan, a reduction of 550 million, or 3 percent, compared with the figure for 1985; in 1987 it was 16.3 billion yuan, a reduction of 1.1 billion yuan, or 6.2 percent, compared with the figure for 1986²³. There are many reasons for the "financial slide," the main ones being: (1) Shanghai's industrial enterprises are aging and there is no money for their replacement. (2) The reform policy has shifted elsewhere revenue originally raised in Shanghai. For example, 2.128 billion yuan have been shifted to various central ministries and to provinces and cities outside Shanghai because of the price factor in buying at negotiated prices raw and processed materials. A total of 1.47 billion yuan have been shifted to the municipality's enterprise units in order to reduce regulatory taxes and

increase depreciation and thus reduce the tax burden. These shifts have had an adverse effect on Shanghai's local revenue. Therefore, Shanghai proposed that the proportion of the top cut in finances be readjusted, and it requested that the central government come up with a new policy in this respect. In January 1987 Shanghai submitted to the State Council a "Report on Deepening the Reform and on Expanding, Opening Up, and Accelerating Shanghai's Economy in Its Transformation to the Outside World and to Other Models." At yearend Zhao Ziyang and Yao Yilin came to Shanghai in succession. In February 1988 the State Council adopted in principle Shanghai's report and agreed not to change the financial base responsibility in effect for Shanghai for 5 years²⁴. The specific method for doing this was to make Shanghai's revenue in 1987 the base and for each year in the 5-year period to have 1.05 billion yuan turned over to the central authorities. From 1991 on, if its local revenue exceeded 16.5 billion yuan the central authorities and Shanghai would each get 50 percent of the excess revenue. This policy changes the financial relationship that has existed for a long time between the central authorities and Shanghai. Shanghai will also be able to obtain more resources. Its action in taking the initiative to ask that a new system be put into practice differed from the past model for reform in which the central government took the initiative in such matters.

To satisfy local interests each place is given a different preferential policy by the central authorities; for example, there are the financial responsibility systems for Shanghai and Guangdong, the foreign trade and foreign exchange responsibility systems for various provinces and cities²⁵, the policy for the coastal zones of opening to the outside world, and the protectionist policy for remote regions. These different policies have led to the expansion of the power of local governments to redistribute resources. They have also aroused the initiative of these governments. After the financial responsibility system was put into effect in Shanghai, Jilin Province and Nei Mongol Autonomous Region formally requested that the local large-scale financial responsibility system also be put into effect in them²⁶. At the same time, there is a "climbing competition" between local governments. The governor of Hunan Province said that when the people of his province saw how Guangdong was developing they hoped that the central authorities would give Hunan a similar preferential policy²⁷. The chairman of the Planning Commission of Jiangsu Province said that in many respects Jiangsu does not have a preferential policy like Guangdong's. For example, the proportion of its finances that Guangdong turns over to the higher authorities is low, the proportion of foreign exchange is high (the state stipulates 100 percent for special economic zones and 50 percent for nationality autonomous regions; for Guangdong and Fujian the figure is 30 percent and for other places it is 25 percent; also, there are three special economic zones in Guangdong), and it is responsible for credit transfers²⁸. Local governments are now asking that the central government give them preferential policies. After such policies are put into

practice, changes are bound to occur in the the relationship between the central government and the local government. This is an effect that is also bound to be caused by the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of local interests. The divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests hands over to the locality the responsibility for satisfying interests, and the locality then cannot but do all it can to expand its own resources and reduce those on which the central authorities take their top cut. This is the main force now changing the relationship between the central government and the local government. It promotes the development of the locality and at the same time poses a challenge to the system. It has already drawn a high degree of attention from people.

4. The divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests is now being gradually formed, and the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of forces with satisfaction of interests has already been transformed. Looking at the general trend we see that the former system will be further enhanced and developed. In other words, the functions of the local government will be further expanded and the functions of the central government will be further contracted. On the one hand, this effect is caused by the central government's transfer of power to the lower level, which it has constantly done since the reform began. In the plan to reform the organizations of the State Council that was recently put forward, the basic aim is to reduce direct intervention, improve administrative efficiency, and strengthen regulation and control, including the smoothing out of the relationship between the central government and the local government²⁹. Then there are the results caused by various factors that have appeared after the reform. As the preceding analysis shows, these factors led to an expansion of the local government's functions that went contrary to wishes, and also led to the unification of the central government's policies, management, and control. Although the transfer of power to the lower level created unprecedentedly favorable conditions for China's social and economic development, it engendered some worrisome problems given China's special historical, social, and cultural circumstances.

On the question of which system is best—the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests or the divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests—there has always been a controversy in China. When the reform began the theoretical circles, in analyzing the malpractices of the existing system, came up with two different opinions. One opinion was that not enough power was concentrated at the center and economic management was too disordered. Therefore, the central authorities should remain primary in management. The other opinion was that too much power was concentrated at the center, the locality had

too little power, and management was too rigid. Therefore, there should be a decentralization of management, under the central government's unified leadership but with the local government made primary³⁰. Eventually, although the focus was put on reforming the relationship between the state and the enterprise, the second opinion prevailed. The historical lesson in China of concentrating power at the center and of transferring power to the locality was: unity leads to rigidity, rigidity to clamors, clamors to release of power, release of power to chaos, and chaos to unity³¹. Can this revolving circle be broken now? It is probable that we will have to wait a while for the answer to this question. Theoretically speaking, the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests stifles the locality's initiative and causes economic development to lose its vigor. It is difficult for unified management in which policy decisions are made at the center to take into account comprehensively the differences in local interests, and so bureaucracy is multiplied. If the divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests is not handled well and there is too much decentralization, the central government will lose control. It will be impossible for the central government to regulate the national economy, disorder will appear in social and economic development, and selfish departmentalism will multiply. Under the circumstances in which the market mechanism is not perfected and the commodity production is not developed, if the divided power-type system is practiced it will be easy for the latter situation to arise. On one hand, the local government has a clear understanding of local interests; on the other hand, it is compelled by circumstances to take administrative measures that intervene in the local economy. A contradiction will occur between the local interests represented by the local government and the overall interests represented by the central government, and the contradiction will lead to duplicated investment, duplicated construction, protectionist markets, and blockaded raw and processed materials³². All these results will be even more unfavorable to social and economic progress. Chinese scholars have discussed these problems. Some of them said that if economic power is not relatively decentralized, there will be no vigor in the economy. However, if political power is also appropriately decentralized, there will be mutual interventions and impediments in the principal parts of all kinds of interests. It will be impossible to come up with policy decisions that can be effectively implemented. As a result, the national strength will be depleted and the efficiency and stability adversely affected³³. Under the past system in China, in which political and economic affairs were fused into an organic whole, the two could not be completely separated. Economic decentralization entails political decentralization, and they are only different in degree. Therefore, the abovementioned problems are bound to come into existence.

The large-scale financial responsibility system recently put into effect makes people ponder more deeply: Will large-scale responsibility at the lower level shake the

macroeconomic balance? Will divided markets and separate economic regimes appear? Will a chaotic situation appear in the economy³⁴? Will local feudal regimes be formed? People hold two opinions on these questions. One opinion holds that these things would not happen, because the central government formulates the monetary policy. If markets are divided, economic mechanisms can be used to coordinate them. The central government's laws and decrees are unified, and the armed forces and the power of the provincial party secretary to appoint and dismiss can be brought into play³⁵. The other opinion was the exact opposite. It holds that local large-scale responsibility more strongly divides the "pieces," is unfavorable to the formation of unified markets throughout China, is unfavorable to the exercise by the enterprise of the right to act on its own initiative, weakens macro control, and intensifies local administrative intervention; the spread of the large-scale responsibility system would weaken the functions of the central government³⁶. At the present time there are places in real life in which the two opinions tally with each other, and there is no final confirmation as to which opinion is correct.

No matter what, the changes in the relationship between the central government and the local government are worthy of attention. The clarification of local interests, the division of power in the satisfaction of interests, and the expansion of local functions will engender some trends. For example: (1) The strengthening of the local government's functions will cause more intervention by the local government in the regional economy. Following the division of power in satisfying interests, the local government's authority will expand relative to that of the central government, and the position of the provinces and cities that have abundant resources will grow, thereby bringing about a new economic and political situation. (2) The interaction between the local governments will be greatly enhanced, for example, in lateral economic coalitions³⁷, regional development strategy³⁸, and economic zone development³⁹. The increase in these activities will, on one hand, lead to new patterns in the relationship between local governments; on the other hand, it will lead to new demands for control. After the central government transfers power, there is the question of what the new regulating and controlling mechanisms will be and who will resolve conflicts. (3) The economic system in which the localities themselves form an organic whole easily lays the foundation for selfish departmentalism, and it will be difficult for the market mechanisms to break through some artificial obstacles. Regional protectionism will also be on the rise. Because the central government depends on the local government for its revenue, and also depends on the local policies to satisfy the localized interests, it must make concessions to regional protectionism. When the growth of the abovementioned factors surpasses a certain range, it will lead to separate economic regimes and thus the loss of macro control will not be impossible. There is a precedent for this situation. The Yugoslav Federal Government designed a blueprint that transferred the powers of

production, business, and management down to the enterprise. But in the process the powers became concentrated in the hands of the governments at the level of each republic and autonomous province. Consequently, 8 mutually sealed-off, separate markets were formed in the 6 republics and 2 autonomous provinces, a situation that became an important reason for the economic crisis in Yugoslavia⁴⁰. In the Khrushchev era the Soviet Union made a similar reform, which expanded on a large scale the locality's role in economic management and for a while created chaos⁴¹. During its process of reforming the economic system and of streamlining government administration and releasing power, China should guard against the same possibility.

Another factor that cannot be overlooked is the new mechanisms brought by the reform of the political system. These mechanisms are also changing the relationship between the central government and the local government. In the past the leaders of the local government were appointed by the central government in a unified manner, and they were made responsible to the central authorities. Following the advance toward democratic politics, the leaders of local governments will, in line with the Constitution, be produced by the elections of local people's congresses. The exercise of different-term elections gives real meaning to the election process, and the leaders of the local government will gradually be made responsible to the local people's congress. The jurisdiction of the central government over the personnel affairs of the local government will be relatively contracted following the perfecting of the local people's congress. Thus, different-term elections limit the power of the central government to appoint and dismiss local leaders. From 15 January to 6 February 1988, in 20 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions in China there were term elections to the National People's Congress [NPC], government, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, higher people's court, and people's procuratorate. According to statistics, in these 20 places at local NPC sessions over 10 deputies jointly recommended 190 candidates for the abovementioned posts. Of them 54 were listed as formal candidates and 8 were elected. In Henan Province, more than 100 persons were jointly chosen for election to the vice governor post⁴². In Beijing Municipality there were 10 candidates for the post of vice mayor, and in different elections 7 were elected. In Anhui Province 30 deputies jointly nominated a former mayor of Tanling City, and he was elected vice governor of the province⁴³. In the elections in Shanghai Municipality, two former vice mayors were defeated. Looking at the present situation, we see that the full posts in the local government, in general, are still filled by people recommended and approved by the central authorities, but that for the deputy posts there is a greater difference in this situation. Following the development of the local NPC, the elections for full posts face new problems. After the practice of holding different elections was put into effect, the local NPC deputies make local interests the criteria for judging candidates. If a candidate wants to be elected he must show that he can

satisfy local interests. The local NPC deputies judge a candidate based on his achievements in the locality. This situation is especially the case under the divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests. This system heightens the consciousness of local interests and becomes an important force in deciding the outcome of an election. With this structure new procedures for regulation and control and new methods are needed in the political system; otherwise, the political system will not be able to adapt.

The change in the relationship between the central government and the local government caused by the reform of the economic system has produced both positive and negative results. If the negative results are not brought under control, they are bound to have serious consequences. In the transition from the system of combining highly centralized redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests to the divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests, the important question is how to maintain political unity. The new social and economic mechanisms pose new challenges to the old system. To meet these challenges the political system must have in itself the new procedures, new standards, and new subsystems that suit the changed economic system and that regulate and control it. Zhao Ziyang recently brought up the topic of studying the new order in the socialist commodity economy, namely, studying how to adapt systems, actions, and standards to the commodity economy, and how to avoid the emergence of such negative phenomena as loopholes, disorder, disjointedness, and loss of balance⁴⁴. This is a demand imposed upon the political system by some phenomena. China faces two difficult choices: If power is not transferred to the lower level it will be impossible to invigorate the economy and move it toward modernization; but the transfer of power to the lower level brings with it extremely great difficulties to the regulation and control by the political system. China's political system is, of course, not perfect and it is in the process of being developed. China has the arduous task of coping with the challenges posed by the divided power-type system of combining redistribution of resources with satisfaction of interests. For a fairly long time China will have to consider conscientiously how to cope with these challenges. How it copes will have a bearing on the success or failure of the reforms and also whether they can be implemented more smoothly.

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Better Supervision of People's Delegates Urged
40050293b Beijing FAZHI RIBAO in Chinese
9 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Cai Dingjian 5591 1353 0494: "Cursor Discussion of the Strengthening of Supervision Over People's Delegates"]

[Text] Supervision of people's delegates by the electorate or electoral units is crucial to the socialist democratic system. In China, which practices the people's congress system, whether the people's delegates conscientiously and correctly exercise authority bears on the issue of whether the people are masters of their own affairs. Therefore, strengthening of supervision over people's delegates is a major link in the perfection of the people's congress system, and the development of socialist democracy.

China's constitution and electoral laws set the following principles for the supervision and dismissal of delegates: People's delegates at all levels are to maintain close ties with their electoral unit and constituents in order to hear and report the people's views and desires. Their constituents or electoral units are empowered to dismiss the delegates that they have elected at any time. Dismissal of delegates that the electorate has directly elected must be approved by more than half of the people's congress at that level. When the congress is not in session, more than half the members of its standing committee must pass it. Dismissed delegates may either be present at the foregoing meetings or make a written appeal. Appeal resolutions must be forwarded in a memorandum to the people's congress standing committee at the next higher level. Specific procedures for the dismissal of delegates are prescribed by provincial, autonomous region, or directly administered municipality people's congress standing committees.

Provisions of China's laws pertaining to the supervision of delegates are not being implemented very well at the present time, mostly for the following reasons: First, legal provisions are not complete, making the execution of certain supervisory powers difficult. Principles for the supervision and dismissal of delegates provided by law are still very rarely specific enough to ensure implementation of the law. Although the law empowers provincial people's congress standing committees to set specific supervisory procedures, in fact very few places have prepared regulations. Second, some barriers exist in understanding. Possibly because of the influence of the "dictatorship" era, when "supervision" was usually

applied only to malefactors, people still shy away from "supervision." Consequently, in reality, it is only after a delegate who has violated the law or committed a crime is investigated and accused of a violation of party discipline or the law that dismissal is suggested. To suggest the dismissal of a delegate who does not discharge his responsibilities or who is incompetent is very difficult. Willingness to supervise is slight, and the willingness of either the electorate or of the next higher level of people's congress to supervise delegates, as well as the willingness of delegates to accept supervision, is not strong. This point is closely related to the way in which the people's congress system actually discharges its role. Since people's congresses cannot exercise their required role, people maintain a doubtful attitude about the role of delegates in national political life, and consequently are not very interested in supervising delegates as well.

Better supervision of people's delegates requires solution of the following problems:

1. Resolving the relationship between delegates and the electorate and electoral units on a theoretical level, by which is meant solving the problem of whose interests delegates represent. There are two choices in answering this question: Delegates either represent so-called "total interests," or else they represent the interests of the electorate or the places that elected them.

The writer maintains that, in reality, no such thing as the will and interests of a "whole people" in the abstract exists. The will and interests of a whole people exist in the will and interests of every part and place. The combination of the people's will and interests in each place and sector equals the will and interests of the whole people. Therefore, the representatives of each place and sector should genuinely and fully reflect the interests and desires of the people in the local area and local sector. It is through the collision and reconciliation of different wills and interests that the will and interests of the whole people are shaped. Therefore, whether a delegate reflects the will and desires of those people he represents is the standard for judging whether a delegate fulfills his responsibilities. Likewise, for the electorate and electoral units, it is whether a delegate reflects their views and interests that is the standard for exercising supervision over a delegate. Thus, when standards for the supervisor and the supervised are clear, keeping informed and supervising becomes easy. These standards for supervision can greatly increase the enthusiasm of the electorate and electoral units for supervising delegates.

However, advocacy of the theory that a delegate reflects the interests of the electorate or an electoral unit comes up against a difficult-to-solve problem in China, namely just whose interest a delegate represents when he or she has been designated for election by the next higher echelon, and how supervision of the delegate is to be exercised. Delegates who have been designated for election frequently have no contact with the electorate or

electoral units, and they do not know the interests and desires of the electorate or electoral units. Nor do the electorate and electoral units know the activities of delegates, so they have no way of exercising supervision. The ultimate way of solving this problem is to abolish the method whereby delegates are designated from above. This requires reform of the delegate structure. For example, people's congresses should not become stopovers for leading cadres in party and government agencies on their way to retirement, and incumbent government officials should not go on to become people's congress delegates. This is the only way to greatly reduce or abolish delegates designated by higher authority.

2. Openness about people's congresses and the activities of delegates. Openness about the activities of people's congresses and delegates is a prerequisite for exercising supervision over delegates. By their very nature, people's congresses and the activities of delegates are not secret, nor should they be secret. Of the activities of all government agencies in the country, it is theirs that are most visible, and also most amenable to supervision by the masses of people. To say that the activities of China's people's congresses cannot be completely open applies only to certain objective conditions and technical reasons (such as meeting places being limited in the number of visitors they can accommodate, and the publication of minutes of meetings being limited by recording techniques, etc.). One cannot say that activities cannot be open because of any security reasons to speak of. Therefore, when openness of people's congress activities is talked about, what is meant is that insofar as objective conditions permit, nothing should be held back, and without openness there can be no supervision.

Right now, the following several things can be done, at minimum, for openness in the activities of people's congresses: (1) Take full advantage of the role of all news media, allowing reporters to attend all congress meetings and interview individual delegates. Additionally, people's congresses should publish their own periodicals and newspapers, and report all activities in a timely fashion. These newspapers and periodicals should circulate freely. (2) A people's congress auditing system should be established, and visitors' galleries set up in people's congresses insofar as conditions permit. (3) There should be gradual movement toward publicizing minutes of meetings and briefings. If general dissemination is not possible, at least those who ask for them should be guaranteed supply.

Perfection of a concrete supervisory system. First, the reasons for dismissal should be spelled out. Dismissal is not limited to delegates who have violated laws or party discipline, but should also include those who do not faithfully discharge their duties, or who fail to heed the will of the people, as well as "bureaucrat delegates" who are out of touch with the electorate. Second is the building of a sound supervisory mechanism. Consideration should be given to changing the qualifications

examination committees for people's congress delegates at all levels into permanent delegate qualifications examination and supervisory organizations. They should regularly ensure contact between delegates at the local level and people's congress delegates at the next higher level who were elected by people's congresses at the local level, and be informed about the activities in which they are engaged. They should accept and hear criticisms of, accusations against, and suggestions for the dismissal of delegates from constituents and other citizens and units. They should also transmit criticisms of delegates to the delegates themselves, investigate accusations, and report the results of their investigations to the people's congress or standing committee at the local level, with notification to the constituents and electoral units making the accusations. They should hear and preliminarily examine calls for dismissal or removal from office that have been lodged in accordance with legal procedures, and report the results of their examination to the people's congress or its standing committee. Third is widening of supervisory channels. Both the electorate and electoral units can do more than dismiss delegates; they can also draw on the experiences of the USSR and eastern European countries to establish a delegate "recall" system whereby delegates who are not very adept at handling governmental affairs, do not faithfully discharge their duties, or who do not express, or may even contravene, the interests of their constituents or electoral units can be "recalled" in a more readily acceptable way. The delegate inspection system should be changed; a system should be established that both enables delegates to report their work to constituents and to electoral units, and allows them to hear the views of the masses; and a system should be established whereby delegates can receive voters.

Formulation of a delegate system. The duties of such a system would be: First, to define, to particularize, and to systematically prescribe the powers of delegates so that delegates know what their responsibilities are, and how to discharge them. Second is to prescribe the procedures whereby delegates execute their powers and the material support provided. Only when complete conditions are provided delegates for the exercise of their powers can electorate or electoral unit supervision of delegates' failure to perform their duties be fair. Third is to prescribe the nature, the scope, and the method of supervision of delegates. In particular, the various supervisory methods and procedures should be specified so that they can be genuinely carried out.

Political Development in Rural Areas Since 1978
40050145b Shanghai FUDAN XUEBAO [FUDAN
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[Article by Chou Kaiming 0092 7030 2494]

[Text] The reform of China's rural economic system began in 1978 in Fengyang County and other places in Anhui Province, where the practice of contracting production to households was a great success.¹ The 3d

plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, which was held in December of the same year, switched the focus of the party's work and the attention of all the people to socialist modernization, initiating a process in which reliance was placed on rural reform to spur on all economic growth. Therefore, in 1979 the successful experiences were laid out on a large scale in all rural areas of China. During the 1980-1984 period, productive forces that had been held back for a long time by the old system were once more called out, and the gross value of social output grew on average nearly 9 percentage points each year.² It was the growth in agriculture that led to the fast growth in the national economy during this period. This did not mean that rural reform had made a substantive change in the layered structure of rural society. The fact that the rural areas now face more and more new problems is clear proof that it did not. Therefore, it becomes more necessary with each passing day to investigate and guide rural reform from the angle of the structured characteristics of growth and from the angle of the important factor conditioning economic development, namely, political developments.

I

In this article political developments are defined as: the general goal of the political policymakers, under specific historical-social-cultural conditions, to adapt to the demands made by the changes and developments in society and by the political developments themselves; the efforts of policies to open the way for economic development; and the actual effects on the movement of the society and the economy.

It cannot be said that today's political developments can completely transcend those accumulated by history; the political developments of the past will always be the foundation of the political developments of today.³ Therefore, to know precisely the effect of the changes made since 1978 on the development of history, it is necessary to make a retrospective analysis of the political background before the reform and the structure of social relationships afterwards.

In the long, continuous course of China's feudal society, the clan organization and the clan relationship were the ruler's deliberately used catalytic way of ruling, and they were closely combined with the system of concentrating power at the center. The vertical social control exercised by the clan organization over the countryside, into which it was impossible for the administrative organizations to penetrate, was linked with the direct control of the locality's central administrative power. Together they exercised firm control over every basic unit.

After New China was established, even if political and administrative controls occupied the dominant position, politics could not, and also did not, replace the vivid life of the actual society. At the same time, because we were always in a cultural atmosphere of the idea of the clan, we were not clearly conscious of the negative influences

that this idea had on political developments; so we did not make the task of repressing and eliminating this influence on political life and political culture in political developments that on which to work from start to finish. Thus the efforts to weaken the influence of the patriarchal clan system in the actions of the different principal parts of the administration in various areas was very imbalanced. Also, because the system for effectively weakening the influence of the clan forces had to be conditioned by the characteristics of the various areas and regions, by historical factors, and by all sorts of administrative powers, these influences still existed to varying degrees in various places. Therefore, in the structure of social relationships in the rural areas, this characteristic appeared: administrative forces became the surface structure controlling the life of the rural areas. Latent in this structure was the clan relationship, the role and influence of which varied. In places where the intervention by administrative forces was fairly deep-going, the relationship between relatives played the controlling role. The surface structure and the latent structure, in their different roles of administering the economy and the society, were themselves structured into a unity in the life of the rural commune area. Thus, the former range of the clan organization's role, after New China was established, was occupied by the dual combination of the administrative forces on the one hand and the relationship of clan or relatives on the other. The clan relationship and the ties of blood occupy an important position in social life. They are highly unfavorable to the development and growth of the relationships in the new model of society and to the concept of value. Especially now, when we face the pressing task of developing the commodity economy, it becomes a more prominent contradiction.

In places where the consciousness of clan has been fairly thoroughly weakened, the influence of the administrative forces on the life of the commune area are likewise worrisome. For what it is worth, this writer thinks that the invisible power structure's controlling influence and position in the distribution of interests cause readjustment in the interests mechanism, and create all sorts of difficulties for the achievement of the general goal of the common wealth.

Therefore, the different degrees of the effect on the clan relationship and the ties of blood after they take a pounding, and the strength or weakness of the administrative forces, put the political developments in various places, at different starting points in the reform. They face different phased tasks under the same general goal. All of these things restrict and determine the possibility of making different choices in our process of deepening the rural reform.

II

In the rural reform after 1978 the differences in the active causes of growth can be divided into four stages: (1) 1979-1981, when price rises for agricultural products

were supported; (2) 1982-1984, when the responsibility system linking output to contracts was made primary; (3) 1985, when nonagricultural industrial growth was the active cause; and 1986, when there was support for a fast growth in expenditure and consumption.⁴ These four active causes had their foundation in the different guiding policies in the different periods of time, and their joint effect was to facilitate the swift growth of the rural economy. Of them, the one of most fundamental significance was the putting into practice of the responsibility system linking output to contracts.

The responsibility system linking output to contracts, that is, the policy of contracting production to households, had four beneficial results: First, with the changes in the relationships of property and the adjustments in the relationships of interests, the status of the peasant as essentially being a land owner and his status of being a production manager were fused into one; next, in the rural areas, plans of an industrial nature for production and administrative control over production were done away with. As a result some key elements that had been fettered and left idle were appropriately brought into play. Furthermore, the Chinese peasant's age-old zeal for land was provided with a psychological guarantee. All these beneficial results caused a high degree of zeal and an enthusiasm for production to spread among the peasant. According to an analysis, in the 9 percent growth rate of agriculture (1980-1984), about 5 percent was the reflection of the policy of contracting production to households. The effect of this excitation mechanism was of a bursting nature. It was not completely caused by the combined effects of technological progress, introduction of key elements, and appropriate deployment; the 4 percent growth rate after 1984 proves this point.⁵ Then why was it impossible for this excitation effect to be strengthened again during the new system's blazing of new trails? How was the great effectiveness of the policy of contracting production to households on changes in the organizational structure to be reflected? With the demand for measures in the supplemental system not being able to be timely satisfied, what would be the influence on the development of the rural areas?

Before the reform, under the planning system in the rural areas which carried out the "three-level ownership" of commune, production brigade, and production team, the production team was the basic unit for the organization of production, and the cadres arranged production and unified work. The family was the first link in social production, and in the lives of the rural commune area. The systemized collective form of work and labor was the second link in the life of the rural commune area. Its main functions were the coordination of production, the exchange of information, and the suitable adjustment of the balance between recreation and psychology. Through its influence in the conduction of information, it controlled the first link. The family had only a few functions in production, besides the tending of progeny. The implementation of the policy of contracting production to households changed the organizational structure of

the entire commune area. The first link—the family—then undertook the main functions in production, life, and the tending of progeny. The second link was replaced by the connections between township and village, between relatives, and between neighbors. Because of the broad extent of social connections, the strength or weakness of economic capability, and the unbalanced distribution of political resources, there were conspicuous differences in the roles of the different principal parts of the second link. In this kind of setup, the possibility of new successes in economic and social life placed greater reliance on the quality of family members. In the role of the second link, which combined social relationships with the family as the core and social connections, this reliance was magnified. Therefore, this change led to the withdrawal of administrative control in the collective mode of production with its mechanically equitable factors, and this withdrawal implicitly led to the tendency for the unequal distribution of political resources to reveal itself and expand.

Since liberation the family—this production unit—has not been able to satisfy completely the demand for production, especially in the busy agricultural season. Therefore, the necessary coordination in production seems to be the thing to accomplish. The family naturally becomes the main unit for undertaking this task of coordination. Worthy of attention is the question of where it will seek cooperation and support. In the rural areas of central Jiangsu that this writer investigated, the role of the administrative forces had a fairly thorough effect on the clan forces. The need for coordination in production organized by families became a socially motivating cause for making the relationship between relatives closer. In the relationship between relatives, the obstacles dividing people are small, and it is fairly easy to establish an identity of understanding. Naturally, the relationship between relatives becomes the first choice for obtaining support. In places where the economy is relatively backward, the regions are fairly inaccessible and the withdrawal of administrative control has not been replaced by an effective weakening of the clan connection. In these places the demand for coordination in dividing fields among households becomes a promotional factor that is just right for making the connection closer. Where the economy is not developed, the management structure, in which agricultural crops are made primary, relies on nature. In the clan's activity, the reverence for gods is expressed in the clan members' desire to pray for favorable weather. Where the economy is developed, particularly in places where the individual economy is fully developed, like certain coastal provinces, the clan's influence is traditionally fairly strong. With the addition of the restrictions imposed by regional conditions, the forces and the connections of the clan still exist. The phenomenon of the revival of clan activity has also appeared, but the mechanism for this revival is utterly different.

In carrying forward the policy of contracting production to households, the government has made a short-term increase in agricultural investment, which has had a

stabilizing effect on the development of small cities and towns. The growth in the peasants' income spurs the growth in the national economy, which is mainly achieved through the development of small cities and towns, the government's construction of basic facilities in townships and villages, the increase in commercial network points, the building of roads linking townships and villages, and the widespread use of bicycles as a means of transportation; and the prosperity of small cities and towns is made possible. Thus the "pull of demand" stimulates the development of the urban economy and the development of local industry. In addition, that part of the labor force that is drawn into the development of the township and town enterprises plays an important part in promoting the prosperity of small cities and towns. The development of cultural undertakings in small cities and towns lays the foundation for them to be commercial, economic, and cultural centers, and for the frequent intercourse between township and village to become an important part of social mobility. This, without a doubt, is of very positive significance for breaking through the originally sealed-off structure in the rural areas and for promoting the development of social coordination. However, to what degree, in the final analysis, is the prosperity of small cities and towns spurred on by the development of the "commodity economy"? We discovered that a very big part of the business activity promoting the prosperity of the small cities and towns was that the policy of contracting production to households facilitated the switch from collective business activities to the large amount of business activity conducted by the peasant household. The peasant household expanded by several times the work it had previously done for the completion of the means of production (chemical fertilizer, agricultural chemicals, and agricultural implements), for the purchase of the necessities of life, and for the sale of agricultural products. The greater business costs sustained the prospering situation in the small cities and towns, and gave this prosperity a further boost. Of course, the youths in the rural areas are a new force, and they play an important role in the development of the rural areas. They have become practitioners in commerce, transportation, and other newly arising nonagricultural occupations, and an important component part of the enterprises and businesses. But their existence has not changed, in the rural areas as a whole, the slack situation of a lack of capability for self-organization and of weakening administrative functions at the village and team levels. Life in the commune area must still go on under a kind of historical inertia.

The seriousness of the problems revealed by the above phenomena has been jointly recognized by persons of noble aspirations. With regard to the deep-layered reform of the rural areas, these persons say: "If we do not weaken the original organizational ties and do not foster new organizational elements and self-organizing mechanisms, it will be difficult to complete the structural change. It will be difficult to produce an organizational system that meets the long-term goals of rural reform.

The key to the problem lies in which field to weaken the original organizational relationships, and also in the order and degree of this weakening, so as to aid the gradual growth of the self-organizing mechanisms. The key does not lie in instigating the expansion of unorganized forces, which would cause a 'collapsing effect' in which there would be no way to cope and in which there would be periodic shocks."⁶ Without a doubt this is an enlightening train of thought.

III

The implementation of the responsibility system of linking output to contracts led to the strengthening of the family's functions, to the revival of the connections of clan and relatives, and to the "prosperity" of small cities and towns. Against this background the functions of the village people's committee (group) were enhanced. At the critical level what actions was our reform to take to meet the demands of the goals of political developments? What would be the influence of these actions on the development of self-organizing mechanisms in the rural areas?

After the responsibility system was put into practice, the role of the production team, which had originally been made primary in the completion of economic and production tasks, was reduced. Public affairs at the basic level in the rural areas increased daily, and a strengthening of control was needed. After the beginning of 1980, the village people's committee, which was the masses' self-education, self-control, and self-service autonomous organization, was widely established in the rural areas to meet this need. Established at the same time was the economic cooperative with its two signboards and one group. However, in reality, there were still the original forces of the original production brigade. From personnel to organizational function, there was no great change in appearance. The actual situation was that there was a demand for the village people's committee to organize the "three-self" functions but that it did not fulfill its promise to do so. The economic cooperative was also an empty shell. Studying carefully the cause, we see that the error in the system's design was caused by the fact that there was no accurate understanding of the profound changes that the system's establishment would make in the rural areas. The rural areas' capability for self-organization was overestimated. There was no understanding of the fact that the full display of the economic cooperative's functions was pregnant with the possibility and meaning for improving the capability of the self-organizing mechanisms. We sowed the seeds for enthusiasm and devotion, but the harvest was results that were bitter fruits that nobody expected.

To better illustrate the question of the basic-level stratum in rural society, we will tentatively differentiate the power stratum and the nonpower stratum. Before the reform, in the rural areas at the level of township and

village, the cadres, factory and enterprise leaders, doctors, teachers, and others in the salaried stratum constituted, in a broad sense, the power stratum. Through exchanging the interests of each, they established close connections. On the other side was the scattered, purely agricultural households. They lacked connections and became appendages of the power stratum. After production was contracted to households, the withdrawal of the government's administrative intervention, which contained the factor of equitability (even though the equitability was mechanical) caused the distribution of some interests that this mechanism had restored to flow into the distribution channels of the power stratum. Thus the relationship between wealth and power became closer and there was an intensification of inequality. Such being the case, could the supplemental policy of contracting production to households change, or to what degree could it change, this situation?

Closely following on the rise in prices and the contracting of production to households, the government made the development of nonagricultural industries the goal of its policy. Under the guiding idea of "letting a small number of people be the first ones to become wealthy and have them bring on the common wealth of everybody," it tried to achieve this goal by "letting the party members and the cadres take the lead in creating wealth." Without a doubt these measures played an important role in the course of the growth of the entire rural economy, and its positive effect was considerable. However, the stage in which this policy was implemented was that the gap in income was widened, and the structural change in income level was especially worthy of close attention.⁷

In the rural power structure, it was the village cadre in particular who seemed to have become the representative of moral character in the life of the commune area. He became the one who had to be invited and be the guest of honor at every marriage, funeral, and joyous event of the peasants. The peasants were sure to feel at ease about inviting them, and their faces would light up when the cadres arrived. Their worth was reflected in these cadres, and the cadres were never bored with the process. Making decisions for the people, they became the natural arbiters in disputes between the peasants and in cases of dividing up family property and living apart. Against this social background, the idea of "letting party members and cadres take the lead in creating wealth" was formed.

The village people's committee—this basic-level carrier of policy—after obtaining its vested interests did not think of, or gave little consideration to, its role in the responsibility for working hard to improve the peasant household's capability for production. It did not take the initiative, through service to production of a developmental nature, to increase everybody's income, and it took little interest in society's system of public guarantees. This increased the nonpower stratum's anticipation of risks in production and life. Then the increased

currency reserves held back the production and realization of the motive force for seeking wealth. To acquire wealth, the nonpower stratum, unlike the power stratum, depended on the political resources it had and on being given precedence and special treatment in the distribution of resources and interests in the relationships of business. The greater part of this stratum still depended on their physical powers to earn money. It was difficult for them to break free from the situation in which their income fluctuated at a low level. They always took as their model the material aspect of the power stratum's lifestyle. In particular they sedulously strove for the new in their symbolic position and in the property on which their residence stood. They spared neither labor nor money to establish, by these tangible materials, what they themselves affirmed, and they sought satisfaction and balance. This psychological mechanism proclaimed the natural death of this policy's driving effect. This was the crucial reason for the rigidity in the overall rural situation and for the sluggishness in the growth of new-type industries. It was also a disappointing reply to the question of whether the rural self-organizing mechanism that we are interested in would grow.

Here it is necessary to speak a little bit about the problem of the widening gap in income. Although the rise in the average income level in the initial period of economic development was an indication that the cardinal coefficient in the gap in income distribution is really the first to rise, after that it falls. That is, in it there is a stage in which the imbalance in distribution is intensified. However, more and more facts show that the judgment must not be made that what is first needed is the foundation for a common rise in the total income level. Next, there is the requirement for a correct trend in those fast-growing industries that represent the economic forces, so that after they have a stimulating effect on other industries it will be possible to develop a structure that guarantees resources. Thus, at a certain level of the cardinal coefficient the essential economic growth will begin. Therefore, the policy of "letting a small number of people become wealthy first and then having them bring along the common wealth of everybody" must suit the above-mentioned demands. Only then can we make the following expositions: Under the premise of a rise in the level of total income, some peasant households whose business quality is good, with the support of the government and through their own labor, will first become prosperous and then the common wealth will be achieved. This question, in a certain sense, is also a question of correctly handling the contradiction between equitability and efficiency. Neither of these dual goals can be neglected at the expense of the other. We must, in unifying them in all the stages of development, and in each stage putting particular emphasis on one or the other, make them promote each other. At a certain stage we will stress efficiency only for the purpose of a higher level of equitability. Of course, equitability is relative. On the other hand, we must understand that the one-sided pursuit of efficiency sacrifices equitability, and the price in political developments cannot be understated.

In short, our thinking must be that of serving the goal of establishing self-organizing mechanisms. We must work hard to create conditions (including those in which the principal part is ourselves and those that are extrinsic), so that the correct measures have a stimulating, guiding effect. However, it is not without regret that we have discovered that the expectation for self-organizing mechanisms in the reform cannot be fulfilled as we wished. Some worrisome tendencies have appeared. The increased loss of control in the organizational structure of the society and the psychological trends of society have set up new obstacles to our goals in political developments.

IV

The correct choices of the ways and means for the political developments in the present stage in China's rural areas include the following ones:

(1) Deepen the understanding of the decisive position of rural development. Since the seventies the theory of the science of economic development has more and more come to recognize that the agricultural department, in its own development, is by no means a support department for the state's economic development. It should be seen as, in the overall strategy, a vigorous leading department. The development of agriculture and the development of the rural areas are absolutely necessary for national economic development. They will promote and stimulate industrial development, and they will avoid the one-sided stress on industrial development and the creation of an imbalance in the internal economy.⁸ The goal of our reform is not a lopsided binary structure. As a traditionally great nation in agriculture, China has the arduous task of developing agriculture and the responsibility for making it stimulate and spur on the development of the entire economy. All of this make the development of the rural areas necessary and of great urgency.

(2) It must be fully recognized that political developments in the rural areas are the premise and guarantee for economic development, and they are the guiding principles for carrying out in a sound manner the comprehensive social and economic development. In the principal part of political developments—people—the establishment of self-organizing mechanisms in society that are consistent with the goal of value is the key position in rural developments.

(3) Restraining and weakening the effect and influence of the clan organization relationship will pave the way for the achievement of the other goals in political developments.

(4) Starting with the village people's committee, with its weakened functions, we should work to achieve the goal of political developments in which the activities of the village people's committee replace the role of the clan organization and administrative power. Much effort will have to be expended on the measures and methods to

achieve this goal. For a fairly long time, in creating the conditions for the display of the economic cooperative's functions, the central task will be to establish self-organizing mechanisms.

With the controlling role of the administrative forces in the weakened basic-level organization, it is essential, in the abovementioned measures, to put an end to government corruption and, through restraints, to spur on the standardization of government actions.

Footnotes

1. See "The Second Reform in China's Rural Areas," SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO [WORLD ECONOMIC HERALD], 25 Apr 84.

2. See SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO, 2 May 88.

3. See also Wang Huning's [3769 3337 1380] "Comparative Political Analysis," Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1987 edition, pp 228-241.

4. See "Analysis of the Changes in the Income of Chinese Peasants Since 1978," JINGJI YANJIU CANKAO ZILIAO [ECONOMIC RESEARCH REFERENCE MATERIALS], No 30, 25 Feb 88.

5. See SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO, 2 May 88.

6. See "Choices in the Movement Toward Modernization," State Council, Institute of Central Developments in Agricultural Research, 1987 edition, Economic Science Publishing House, p 40.

7. See Robert (Darr), author, and Wang Huning, selector: "Modern Political Analysis," Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1987 edition, p 120.

8. See Tao Daying [7118 1129 5235] and others: "Ten Lectures on Modern Western Economic Theory," Jiangsu People's Publishing House, Nanjing, 1988, pp 246-249.

Current People's Congress System in Rural Areas Termed 'Useless'

40050156 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG GUANLI [CHINA ADMINISTRATION] in Chinese No 10, 16 Oct 88 pp 37-39

[Article by Wang Kean 3769 0344 1344 of the Science and Society Research Institute, Huazhong Normal University]

[Text] Our Constitution stipulates that China is a socialist people's democratic dictatorship and all power rests with the people. The People's Congress system is the fundamental political and organizational system by which the people exercise their power.

This article will discuss the issue of perfecting the people's congress system in rural areas, the core of the grassroots political power structure in agricultural villages. Of course, the perfection of the rural people's congress system touches on many areas. Limited by space constraints, this article will discuss a few views on the issue of whether the people's congress in rural areas should have their own standing bodies.

The PRC constitutional laws promulgated at the 5th plenum of the 5th National People's Congress [NPC] only stipulated the establishment of standing committees for local people's congresses at the county level or above. That is to say, the people's congresses in rural areas containing the grassroots political power at the levels below the county are not to have standing bodies, but rather the village people's governments are to act as the executive organs for implementing people's congress resolutions at this level. Because the people's congresses in the rural areas have no standing committees, the "organization laws" of the local people's congress and the local people's governments stipulate that the village people's governments are responsible for convening the people's congresses in the rural areas. The 18th plenum of the 6th NPC Standing Committee convened at the end of 1986 made important amendments regarding the "resolution" to revise the local people's congresses and the organization laws of the local people's governments. The amended organization laws stipulate that "when village, nationality village and town people's congresses hold meetings, they shall select a presidium to preside over the meeting and be responsible for convening the next meeting of the people's congress at that level." (Article 14) At the same time, it is stipulated that the first meeting of each people's congress in rural areas shall be convened by the presidium from the previous rural people's congress. (See Article 15) That is to say, this changes the former practice whereby the village people's government would convene the village people's congress at its level. This revision undoubtedly is a major step forward in perfecting the people's congress system in rural areas.

However, from a legal standpoint, we still find it difficult to believe that this presidium is worthy to be called a 'standing body' for the people's congresses in rural areas. This is because its powers are limited to the convening of the people's congress and it has been given no other powers. Moreover, basically no provisions have been made for those organizational organs that commonly act as standing bodies (like the "presidium" we were discussing). Thus, we can say with confidence that the issue of whether the people's congresses in the rural areas should establish their own standing bodies has not been resolved. So the way I see it, this issue awaits prompt resolution.

In my view, the people's congress in the rural areas must have its own standing body. The following are reasons for this contention:

First, we look at the legal authority of the people's congresses in rural areas. There are a total of 12 powers given to the people's congresses in rural areas. (See Article 9 of the "Organization Laws.") We can almost say that if the people's congresses in the rural areas did not have their own standing committees, it would be very difficult to fully implement any of these 12 powers. For example, the third power is "to decide upon the construction plan for the economy, cultural undertakings, and public undertakings with the pertinent administrative region in accordance with the State plan." Also, it is obvious that construction planning problems that affect the entire jurisdiction cannot be dealt with by convoking a people's congress and drawing up a plan after a few days. Special investigations, painstaking study, and earnest design are required. In particular, there are definite problems in using this method in areas where the scope of decision-making is broad and the policy and legal limits are strictly drawn in light of the current ideology, culture, quality, and policy levels of our nation's broad grassroots people's congresses. In this sense, without the industrious labor of special personnel it would be quite difficult to draw up and decide upon a plan that would be anything but rough and hasty and that would produce anything but improvident results. Thus, without the constant high-volume work of specialized members on the standing committees, to a certain extent there is the danger that the powers of the people's congresses in rural areas will amount to nothing.

Second, we look at the operational mechanism of the people's congresses in rural areas. Acting as an authoritative body, "the people's congresses in rural areas" does not refer to some special kind of meeting but rather is a component within the system of state organs at a certain level in the same way that the head of state is not a person but rather is a component of a state's highest administrative body. However, without its own standing body, the people's congress in rural areas, this apparatus with a certain kind of existence is bound to lack continuity in time within the category of atemporal concepts and exhibit a "gap" within space. In this way, it will inevitably vanish over a certain period of time and from a certain space. This will put a halt to the integrated operational mechanism of the people's congress in rural areas and will bring about temporary disintegration in the system of power. It is no wonder that not only many people from the general masses but even numerous state cadres mistakenly understand the people's congress to "exist only when in session." Put simply, without a standing body, it will be extremely difficult for the rural people's congress to become anything but an on and off affair.

Third, we look at the peculiarities of China's system of political power. In the central government, the State Council is the highest organ for executing the mandates of the NPC. In local government, the local people's governments at all levels execute the mandates of the local people's congress. In political power at the grassroots agricultural village level, the village people's government executes the mandates of the rural people's

congress. Thus, the first item of legal authority for village people's government stipulates that it "execute the resolutions of the rural people's congress of the pertinent level." This signifies that the authoritative body has the power to check and correct errors and any deviations in the work of bodies executing their authority. However, practice has shown that this generally happens only at county levels or above because people's congresses at county levels and above have their own standing committees that can undertake this mission. However, because the rural people's congress within the grassroots political power structure doesn't have its own standing body, it can supervise the work of village government only during times when it is actually meeting. The "organization laws" stipulate that the rural people's congress has the power to "rescind inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's governments of the villages, national minority villages, and towns." However, this is not feasible because, when the Congress is not in session, who is there to discover a problem and decide and act to "rescind" it? Considering the principle of balance of powers, the people's government, acting as the body to execute the powers, can hardly "rescind" its own decisions and orders. In this sense, it is imperative that the rural people's congresses have their own standing bodies.

Indeed, if the rural people's congresses are to set up their own standing bodies (regardless of the temporary name), we must do more to work this out and bring more people in and thus increase the property burden on the state and the people. This is true, but not necessarily. If we can hurry to simplify the body we are to set up and hurry to reduce the number of people involved in working it out, then we can more quickly arrive at a point where we spend less money on this.

Last year, Hunan Province, during the interim election period at the village level, established village people's congress presidia generally composed of from five to seven members. No leaders or workers in the village people's governments sat on the presidia. Each presidium had one full- or part-time standing chairman (from the village level) and in addition had a full-time cadre. The nature of this kind of presidium was quite different from those presidia of the past, the special function of which was to preside over regular people's congress meetings. It has become a standing body. As a standing body, it can now assume and carry out its rightful responsibilities and has become an organ of authority worthy of its name. Its duties and missions are to preside over current meetings of the convened people's congress and call periodic meetings after the close of the people's congress when warranted by the situation. The activities of these aperiodic meetings may include: prepare for the next people's congress meeting at that level; supervise, spur on, and check the thorough execution by people's governments and appropriate departments on that level of the resolutions made by this people's congress and higher level people's congress as well as their standing committees; supervise and handle proposals made by

representatives; visit with the electorate and solicit opinions; handle pertinent items of business passed from the standing committees of this people's congress and higher ones, etc. For example, in Changde County, previous village people's congresses were generally called once a year for one meeting. After getting a standing presidium and a full time standing chairman, in the first quarter of last year two people's congresses were convened, each lasting two to three days. This is in basic contrast to former rural people's congresses characterized by "one day meeting, eat some noodles, a show of hands then sit and doodle; most representatives fail to report, so we go through the motions and then depart."

The practices and experiences of Hunan's county bodies are not flawless but it should be said that the practices they have used in setting up standing bodies in the grassroots level rural people's congresses merit investigation and can be adopted. They can undoubtedly have the effect of promoting the perfection of China's people's congress system and strengthening the grassroots agricultural village political power construction, and their significance is not to be belittled.

Various Minority Nationality Issues

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[Article by Zhang Xukai 1728 2485 0418: "Answers to Questions About Nationalities Issues"]

[4 Jan 89 p 4]

[Text] Editors Note: The surge of great waves of reform is beating against the embankment of ethnic tradition, and pounding at the hearts of the members of every nationality. The great gap between old ideas and the new age has produced a "waterfall" that comes down in torrents. The turbulence of the water on the rocks spews forth much foam that lashes tradition, ripples along, and eddies endlessly...the members of every nationality are asking epochal questions: What is becoming of our people? What can our people do? Where are our people headed? "Answers to Questions About Nationalities Issues" is an attempt to use the entirely new concept of reform and opening to the outside world to reply to the various problems that have arisen in relations among nationalities as a result of reform and opening to the outside world. We welcome readers' questions and answers, and feedback of information, in order to help us do a good job on this series. We desire only that these articles become a good teacher and a helpful friend to readers of all nationalities in the study of nationality theories and nationality policies.

1. Will the Introduction of the Competitive Mechanism Destroy Ethnic Equality and Ethnic Unity?

Competition is innately inherent in a commodity economy. With the development of the commodity economy in ethnic areas, the competitive mechanism is bound to

be introduced into ethnic areas and penetrate into the ethnic economy. Some people fear lest introduction of competition might destroy ethnic equality and ethnic unity. This is an entirely groundless fear, and an entirely unreasonable one as well for the following reasons:

First, commodity economies exist in several societal forms; they are not peculiar to capitalism. Practice has shown that socialist economies are also commodity economies. To become strong, both a country and its people must develop a commodity economy. Furthermore, the competition principle inherent in commodity economies is part and parcel of the development of socialist ethnic relations.

Second, the competitive mechanism helps strengthen and develop ethnic ideas of equality. Under socialism, socialist laborers are the main element in the production of commodities. In the development of commodity production, the principle of commodity exchange at equal value is bound to be reflected in relations between one person and another. Between members of different nationalities, and between different ethnic regions, commodity production requires respect for the rights and interests of laborers, and for the fruits of labor. It requires that in the exchange of commodities, producers have equal opportunity and equal status in terms of the right to do business, and enjoy equal rights with no special privileges allowed.

Third, the competitive mechanism helps mutual dealings, mutual exchanges, and mutual learning on the part of all nationalities. The principles of commodity exchange at equal value, and competition on an equal basis, require equal status and equal rights in commodity exchange for members of all nationalities. Special rights ideas and feelings of superiority or such behavior on the part of any nationality will not work in a commodity economy. The more developed a commodity economy, the more ethnic barriers are breached, and the more the narrow psychological and geographic boundaries between nationalities are broken down. This fosters mutual dealings, mutual exchanges, and mutual learning among nationalities, and it helps strengthen ethnic unity.

Fourth, competition fosters development of the ethnic economy. As the commodity economy develops, lateral economic ties among different nationality areas develop further. This promotes mutual congeniality among different regions, economically specialized entities banding together to do business for the promotion of economic cooperation, materials interflow, talent exchanges, technical cooperation, and information exchange among nationalities, thereby hastening development of the economy of nationality areas.

Fifth, competition helps the nationalities prosper and become strong. Commodity competition can spur mutual competition within a nationality, which helps wipe out local inertia and causes a nationality to seek the heights, being roused to liveliness and progress.

From the above it is obvious not only that introduction of the market mechanism will not destroy the equality of nationalities or the unity of nationalities, but that it promotes equality and unity, and aids the strengthening and flourishing of the nationality. Of course the introduction of competition into a nationality area is not for the purpose of getting rid of any nationality. This is because under socialism, competition in the course of ethnic development is guided by the party's nationalities policies, and is consistently based on the fundamental interests of all nationalities. It is competition premised on equality, unity, and mutual help. It is intrinsically different from competition under capitalism.

2. What Was the Nature of the Yakup Bek Regime?

In 1865, the military chief of Kokand, Yakup Bek, invaded China's Xinjiang Province. In 1867, he occupied seven cities in the western part of southern Xinjiang where he established the so-called ["zhe de sha er" 0772 1795 3097 1422 seven cities] regime. Yakup Bek used this regime to continue an aggressive war, cruelly killing Xinjiang people of all nationalities, and trampling China's sovereignty underfoot.

Yakup Bek's aggression against Xinjiang bore a close relationship to the situation inside and outside China at that time. Following the Opium War, China devolved into a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society; the Qing Dynasty government became more corrupt; and everywhere throughout the country anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary struggles occurred in endless succession. Under the influence of the uprising of the Hui people during the period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, raging flames of resistance to Qing Dynasty feudal rule were ignited in Xinjiang, both north and south of the Tian Shan. In 1864, peasants of all nationalities rose in rebellion in Xinjiang, toppling most of the Qing government's ruling institutions there. The rebels had no high-quality leadership, however, and everywhere feudal lords and the upper strata of religion wormed their way into the rebels' ranks and gradually seized leadership. "Sultans" such as [ruo xi ding 3583 6007 0002] of Khoja, [tuo de lin 1185 1779 1545] of Urumqi, and [mai zi mu za te 6701 1320 2606 7177 3676] of Ili, as well as [ha bi bu la 0761 3024 1580 2139] of Hotan, and [si de ke 1835 4104 0344] of Kashgar, etc. occupied separate areas, discriminated against outsiders, and attacked each other. Si de ke was a Kirgiz [a qi mu bo ke 7093 1142 2606 0130 0344] from Tashimilike, who was unable to obtain the support of the Uygurs in Kashgar, so he dispatched people to Kokand in an effort to use the reputation of the Islamic noble Khojas to rally the Muslims. He sent Jin Xiangyin to Kokand, where the Kokand prince regent, [Ai li mu ku le 5337 0500 2606 1655 0519], decided to allow his military chief, Yakup Bek, to accompany [Bu su ke 1580 4790 0344] to Xinjiang. The rulers of Kokand have always used the tactic of exploiting the Khoja descendants to invade Xinjiang. From the end of the 18th to the middle of the 19th centuries, [Yu su fu 3768 4790 3940] Khoja invaded southern Xinjiang. The

Zhanggeer Rebellion, the Seven Khojas Rebellion, and the Wolihan Khoja Rebellion all occurred with the support of the Khokand rulers. [Bu su lu ke 1580 4790 7627 0344] was the son of Zhanggeer, who happened to serve as a puppet of Yakup Bek. Under the banner of the Khoja's descendants, Yakup Bek gathered together a band of desperadoes who invaded Xinjiang in January 1865 and reached Kaxgar, then went on to take the evil road of slaughtering people of all nationalities in Xinjiang and trampling China's sovereignty underfoot.

Under the cruel oppression of Yakup Bek, pools of blood stood everywhere. In order to protect their homes, people of all nationalities in Xinjiang waged a life-and-death struggle against the invaders. People of the Kirgiz nationality were the first to rise and fight. Intense fighting took place in Kashgar and in mountain regions to the northwest of the city. The army and civilians defended the city of Yengisar for more than 40 days during which most of the soldiers and residents died as a result of the siege and the powerful attacks of the enemy. At Maralbashi, southwest of Bachu, more than 3,000 Uygur, Hui, and Han peasants rose to resist the enemy, swearing to die rather than yield. In the Han quarter of Kashgar City, Yakup Bek bribed the Qing army garrison commander, He Buyun, with gold. After entering the city, the troops burned and killed for 7 days. The people of Yarkant (Shache) twice defeated the invaders. All the people inside the city took part in the battle, and 1,200 cooks, bakers, and small peddlers were killed. The inhabitants attacked the aggressor army by night, but were defeated because Aqimubek Niyaz colluded with the enemy and revealed their plans. At the end of 1866, Yakup Bek attended a religious ceremony as a pretext to lure to his death Habibula, who, styling himself "pasha," had set up a separatist regime in Hotan. The people of Hotan courageously resisted the enemy. They loudly shouted the slogan, "drive out the Andizhans," and fought a bloody war with the aggressors in which 50,000 people died under the butcher knives of the Yakup Bek bandit gang. In 1867, Yakup Bek invaded the Aksu-Kucha area. The people of Kucha fought bravely, attacking and killing Yakup Bek's oldest son, Hu da Hu li bo ke [5170 6671 5170 6849 0130 0344]. However, before this happened, Rexiding Khoja, who was busy expanding his domain, was unwilling to mass forces for joint action against the enemy. As a result the battle to reinforce Yarkant, as well as to block actions at Aksu, Yakayireke, and Hezi City ended in failure because of a lack of troops and an inability to coordinate actions. Nor was Kucha held, and Reshidding Khoja was killed by Yakup Bek. In 1870, Yakup Bek invaded Turpan. Not only did the military forces and people of Turpan drive back the invader, but also launched an attack against them, which succeeded for a time in recovering the Kucha area. Unfortunately, the advance could not be sustained, and the garrisoning task was handed over to the weak and isolated residents. Yakup Bek launched a violent counterattack, driving the local people ahead of his formations as cannon fodder, and re-invading Turpan. The various nationalities in Turpan, including the Uygurs

and the Huis, hid in the irrigation system of wells connected by underground channels to avoid the attacks launched by their own people against the enemy. The defense collapsed with the surrender of the defending general, Ma Zhong. When Yakup Bek invaded the Urumqi-Manas area, more than 100,000 people rose in resistance. Subsequently, when Tuodelin was defeated and sued for peace, Yakup Bek's troops massacred the inhabitants of the city, not even sparing children. It took more than 6 years from the time when Yakup Bek invaded Xinjiang until he was able to occupy most of it. The people of various nationalities in Xinjiang paid a heavy price in resisting Yakup Bek's invasion to protect their own homes.

The regime that Yakup Bek established was an aggressor regime at the core of which was a group of desperadoes from Khokand. Every key department, such as the armed forces and the government, as well as the highest positions in every city were virtually all controlled by the Khokand aggressors. Secondly, Yakup Bek relied on a small number of top level religious leaders and turncoat authorities who were willing to die for him. Yakup Bek used the military feudal system that flourished during the middle of the 19th century to exercise control. He established a standing army of more than 50,000 men, which he used to oppress the people. He also maintained a large number of informants in every corner, who constantly injured or killed the people. In *Biography of Yakup Bek*, Bao Luojie wrote: Yakup used police surveillance and military terrorism at will...a melancholy atmosphere impossible to dispel covered the land. Yakup forced religious belief, and more than 40,000 followers of other religions were cruelly murdered. All expenses for the maintenance of the ruling stratum of Yakup's regime, for the huge military forces, and for warfare were squeezed from the blood and sweat of the people. The people were saddled with countless exorbitant taxes and levies including the Wushouer and Zhakati (two different religious taxes), tanafu (cotton-field and fruit and vegetable taxes), samanpuer (wheat straw tax), kunaliewu (a tax extorted by the armed forces), tareke (inheritance tax), halaji (a levy set at 10 percent or more), and the kafusan (an arbitrarily collected surcharge not based on a percentage). The people's land could be sold at will by Yakup. "Yakup sold off completely seven layers of land," was a saying. Many people sank into slavery and were sold abroad. Yakup had more than 600 wives and concubines, and he built luxurious palaces at Kaxgar, Aksu, and Korla where he lived a licentious and shameless life. The masses of people struggled at the line between life and death; the population decreased greatly, and productivity was seriously damaged. The above facts fully demonstrate that the Yakup regime was an aggressor regime that squeezed sweat and blood, and sucked the marrow from the bones of the people of all nationalities. In no way could it represent the interests of the people of various nationalities in Xinjiang.

In order to maintain his rule, Yakup colluded with the ruling classes of Great Britain, Czarist Russia, and

Turkey, causing extreme damage to China's sovereignty. In a contest with Czarist Russia for hegemony in central Asia, colonial imperialist Great Britain had plans for turning Xinjiang into a protective screen. Britain supported Yakup, supplying him with large quantities of rifles and ammunition, equipment for manufacturing armaments, and military instructors. Yakup demanded that Czarist Russia recognize his "independent" position, and Czarist Russia provided Yakup with materials such as cotton cloth and weapons. It also several times sent emissaries to contact Yakup in attempts to get the territory that Yakup occupied under control of Czarist Russia. Yakup expressed a desire to become part of Turkey, acknowledging Turkey as suzerain. The sultan of Turkey conferred the title of "emir" on Yakup, proposing at the same time that Yakup coin money in the name of the caliph, and fly a flag bearing the same colors and the same design as Turkey's. This would be Turkey's conditions for recognizing his position as king, a title that could be inherited by his son following his death. In 1872 and 1874, Yakup signed a "Russian-Yakup Treaty" with Czarist Russia and a separate "British-Yakup Treaty" with Great Britain. These two illegal treaties brazenly violated China's sovereignty. Yakup shamelessly used China's sovereignty to deal with imperialism and its running dogs in a vain attempt to legalize his aggressor regime and detach Xinjiang from China forever. This move was what naturally aggressive colonial imperialism wanted. Before the Yakup regime headed for extinction, the British ambassador to China, Wei tuo ma [1218 1185 3854], intervened directly ostensibly in the name of mediation, but actually as a means of coercion, saying that as a dependent state rather than a subordinate territory, Yakup should not have to pay tribute. He wanted China and Yakup to demarcate their territory and not invade each other. Very clearly, this was for the purpose of preventing the Qing Dynasty from recovering Xinjiang, and to legitimize Yakup's aggressor government. Consequently, the Yakup regime served imperialism and was a tool of imperialist aggression against China.

Yakup's aggressor regime ran counter to the tide of history, and was consequently doomed to extinction. None of Xinjiang's nationalities was willing to be ground under the heel of an aggressor, so the resistance battles never stopped. The Tashkorgan Tajiks, the Artux Halajun, the Akqi Halabulake-Kirgiz, and the Turpan Uygurs all rose in rebellion at one time or another. During the summer of 1871, after Yakup had occupied Urumqi for half a year, the Hui and Han nationalities in Urumqi launched a large scale struggle against tyranny. Enslaved by the Yakup regime, the people of all nationalities in Xinjiang hoped that the Qing Dynasty would soon dispatch troops to retake Xinjiang. In southern Xinjiang, numerous noble chiefs continued to function as Qing officials at the risk of their lives. The chief noble in Kaxgar sent the merchant Baihala across the Tian Shan to Tacheng with supplies to seek an audience with

Rongquan, the general in charge of Ili, to demonstrate that the Uygur people were unwilling to become slaves of Yakup, and wanted to work for the Qing armies early recovery of Xinjiang.

Within the Qing government, the "border defense theory" for the recovery of Xinjiang, of which Zuo Zongtang was the main proponent, was in keeping with the interests of the country and the people, and was supported by the people of the whole country. The Qing government decided to dispatch troops to recover Xinjiang, and in 1875, Zuo Zongtang was made imperial envoy for the supervision of military affairs in Xinjiang. In 1876, a Qing military force numbering more than 60,000 assumed the heavy responsibility of recovering Xinjiang. People of all nationalities in Xinjiang brought them kumiss, offered cattle and sheep, provided intelligence, acted as guides, defended cities, and rose in rebellion in support of combat by the Qing armies. The Qing forces required only 3 months to recover lost territory in northern Xinjiang. In April 1877, they broke through the strategic pass leading to southern Xinjiang. In May, Yakup died in Korla. The Qing armies advanced victoriously, and by January 1878 all the lost territory in southern Xinjiang was recovered. Remnants of the Yakup regime were completely annihilated, and the Yakup regime was completely destroyed.

In summary, Yakup's ability to invade Xinjiang and to tyrannize most of Xinjiang for 13 years was due, externally, to the support provided by British and Russian colonial imperialism; internally, it was because of the inability of the peoples of various nationalities to unite to oppose the enemy jointly and the lack of centralized direction of heroic battles that spontaneously occurred. Even though Yakup had only between 7,000 and 8,000 men at the outset, the people of various nationalities were unable to offer effective resistance to him. After the people of all nationalities had learned a lesson from disaster and reunited, it took only slightly more than a year to wipe out completely the same enemy now having an army of 60,000. This lesson of historical experience was learned at a cost of the lives and blood of several hundred thousand people, and we should never forget it. The Yakup regime was an extremely reactionary aggressive regime, and Yakup was the sworn enemy of the peoples of all nationalities in Xinjiang.

[5 Jan 89 p 4]

3. What Do We Mean When We Say That the Party Is the Faithful Representative of the Interests of People of All Nationalities?

Both the class nature and the advanced nature of the party determine that the party is bound to be the faithful representative of the interests of the people of all nationalities in China.

First, the question of whom one serves is an essential question and a fundamental question. In the final analysis, the nature of a political party is decided by looking at whose interests it represents. In the "Communist Party Manifesto," Marx and Engels pointed out that "all past movements have been movements for a minority or for the interests of a minority. The proletarian movement is an independent movement of an overwhelming majority for the interests of the majority." Comrade Liu Shaoqi noted in his report to the 7th National People's Congress on reform of the constitution that "the CPC can be victorious only when it stands for the interests of all the people, not just for some of the present interests of its own class, and only when it organizes and unites all nationalities and the whole people, not just organizes and unites its own class to carry out the struggle." This shows that as the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party must carry out its historical mission in order to maintain its own character. It positively cannot represent only parochial factional groups' minority interests, but must become the representative of the interests of the broadest masses. At the same time, the Communist Party of China positively cannot represent the interests of each of China's nationalities at a certain time or at a certain stage; instead, it has to always represent the interests of people of all nationalities at all stages of development of the entire movement for realizing the party's historical mission.

Second, the Communist Party of China's program fully embodies the fundamental interests of the people of all nationalities throughout the country. The people's most fundamental interests are to overthrow the domination of the exploiting class, to seize political power, to become political masters in their own house, to administer state power, to abolish classes, and to build their own rich cultural life. The CPC's theoretical program and policies reflect and embody, in a concentrated way, these interests of the masses of people of all nationalities throughout the country. The point of departure and the point of return for all party activities is the interests of the Chinese working class and the mass of the people. During the period of democratic revolution, the party-led struggle against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratism, and to win national independence and national liberation was not just the desire and the demand of the Chinese working class; it was also the desire and the demand of people of all nationalities throughout the country. During the preliminary stage of socialism, the party formulated a basic line for the building of a distinctively Chinese kind of socialism as follows: to lead and unite the people of all nationalities in the country, to make economic construction the key element, to adhere to the four basic principles, and to persist in reform and opening to the outside world, in self-help, and in arduous efforts in a struggle to build the country into a rich and powerful, democratic, and civilized modern socialist country. This not only fully reflects the interests of the Chinese working class, but also fully reflects the fundamental interests of the people of all nationalities in China. Thus, the interests of the party, the interests of

the working class, and the interests of China's nationalities and China's people are identical. The interests of the working class and the interests of China's nationalities and China's people are the interests of the CPC. Apart from these class interests, and the interests of China's nationalities and the Chinese people, the CPC has no special interests of its own.

Third, China is a multinational country having more than 50 different nationalities. In addition to fighting for the common interests of people of all nationalities in China, the CPC also fully considers the special interests of all fraternal nationalities. For historical reasons, the economy and culture of some minority areas is backward. The CPC has consistently adhered to Marxist principles, adopting a series of correct plans and policies to enable the development of individual minority nationalities. The party pursues a policy of ethnic equality and ethnic unity that is resolutely opposed to Han chauvinism and opposed to local nationalism. Insofar as national unity considerations permit, it has instituted local autonomy in areas where minority nationalities live in compact communities, and has carried out democratic reforms and socialist transformation little by little in individual minority nationality areas, keeping the distinctive features of individual minority nationalities in mind, minority nationality areas thereby being able to move along the road of socialism. This policy has had as its goal the eradication of misunderstandings among nationalities inherited from history, raising the status of all nationalities, developing the economy and culture of minority nationality areas, and the promotion of friendship, unity, and cooperation among peoples of all nationalities throughout the country to make China a wealthy and powerful, democratic, civilized modern socialist country. The party provision decided on at the 12th CPC Central Committee meeting provides explicitly that "the CPC safeguards and develops equality, unity, and mutual assistance among all peoples in the country, adheres to a policy of national regional autonomy, helps all minority nationality areas develop their economy and culture, and actively trains and selects minority nationality cadres." These party plans and policies for dealing with domestic nationality issues have demonstrated once again that the Communist Party of China is the faithful representative of the interests of people of all nationalities throughout the country.

To summarize the foregoing, the fundamental standpoint, and the sole aim of members of the CPC is to act in terms of the interests of the people in all matters, to serve the people wholeheartedly, and to faithfully represent the interests of the broadest masses of the people. Thus, the CPC is termed the faithful representative of the interests of the people of all nationalities in China.

4. Is There a Theoretical Basis For the "Two Inseparables"?

The "two inseparables," namely that the Han nationality and minority nationalities are inseparable from each other, is not without a theoretical basis, but rather has a

full theoretical basis. Its theoretical basis is scientific communism, particularly proletarian internationalism and Marxist nationalities theory.

The "Communist Party Manifesto" says that "The differences between communists and other proletarian political parties are as follows: In the struggle of proletarians in every country, it is the communists who emphasize and uphold the common interests of all the proletariat without distinction as to nationality; and it is the communists who always represent the interests of the entire movement in every stage of development of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie."¹ The CPC has consistently adhered to the basic doctrines and basic principles set forth in the "Manifesto." In the study and handling of both international relations or domestic nationalities issues, it has made proletarian internationalism its own basic point of departure.

The motto of proletarian internationalism is "Proletarians of the World, Unite!" When applying this strategic thinking to the handling of domestic race relations, the Communist Parties of all multiracial countries adhere to the principle of racial equality and racial unity. Marxist racial theory has always stressed unity and cooperation among races. Lenin stated explicitly that "the separation of individual nationalities in a country is harmful; therefore, we Marxists seek to bring them into contact with each other and meld them together."² Advocacy of the "two inseparables" is precisely for the purpose of promoting contact and melding all nationalities in China; at the same time, it also expresses the features of ethnic relationships in the country, and shows that relations between the Han race and minority nationalities in China is not a relationship of equality and unity in an ordinary sense. Rather it is a relationship characterized by a high degree of equality, unity, and mutual assistance in which class antagonisms have been eradicated, and in which there is a sharing of weal and woe, honor and dishonor.

Not only is there a full Marxist theoretical basis for "two inseparables" ideas, but also a far reaching historical foundation and a dependable immediate foundation as well.

First of all, since ancient times China has been a unified multiracial country in which the Han race and minority nationalities have relied upon each other. During the long period of historical development, the Han and minority nationalities have had mutual exchanges, learned from each other, and advanced each other politically, economically, and culturally to shape an interdependent, jointly developed totality, and they have jointly created the motherland's long history and magnificent culture. Despite the sharp clashes and struggles that have occurred many times among the various nationalities in the country, and despite even the occurrence of temporary splits and separations, because the mutual dependence and common interests of all nationalities far transcends these conflicts and clashes, the mainstream in

China's historical development has ever been centralization and the unity of all nationalities. The broad masses of working people in both the Han race and the minority nationalities have always been oppressed, and they have always been supporters of the unity of all races. As Comrade Zhou Enlai said, "Historical development has provided us a foundation for cooperation." "When there is division, both parties suffer; when there is cooperation, both parties benefit." This has been the historical experience for a long period of time. The idea of "two inseparables" is, in essence, a profound reflection of the historical reality of China's race relations.

Second, the People's Republic of China is the magnificent result of the long common struggle of the Han race and the minority nationalities, as well as the basic guarantee for common development and prosperity. Ever since the Opium War, not only have people of all nationalities in China continued to suffer the oppression of the country's reactionary class, but they have also suffered from the plundering and enslavement of capitalist, imperialist big powers, and the first to be affected were the fraternal minority races living in frontier regions of the motherland. The Han race and the minority nationalities carried on a brave struggle, advancing wave upon wave in opposition to imperialist and feudalistic oppression at a tremendous sacrifice. In this great struggle against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, the unity and mutual assistance of the Han race and minority nationalities advanced to a brand new stage, and the revolutionary struggles in which both shared a common fate, assumed a brand new complexion, culminating in the winning of a magnificent victory and the building of the People's Republic of China. With the founding of the People's Republic of China, and establishment of the socialist system, the working people of the Han race and the working people of the minority nationalities became masters of the country for the first time ever. They rooted out the social causes of damage to national equality and unity, and created the requisite conditions for the joint development and prosperity of all nationalities in the country. It is evident that the relationship of unity and mutual assistance between the Han people and the minority nationalities of the country stem from common misfortunes, a common fate, common struggle, the fruits of common victory, and the objectives of common struggle, which are all closely related to each other. The "two inseparables" idea is happily the portrayal in action of this objective reality.

In addition, the pattern of distribution of the Han people and the minority nationalities in China is one of many nationalities living together, small communities of a single nationality, and intermingling of peoples, most minority nationalities living in interspersed groups. Statistics show that in more than 70 percent of the country's 2,163 county level administrative units, two or more nationalities live together. Approximately 10 million minority people are scattered throughout the large and small cities, towns, and rural villages of all the provinces

and municipalities in the country. Most of the minority nationalities live in frontier regions where they guard the nation's security and unity, and protect and build the frontiers. This would not be possible without the active participation of the broad masses of cadres and people of the minority nationalities. Of course, without the joint struggle of the broad masses of Han cadres, soldiers, and people, it would not be possible either. The pattern of population and resources distribution, and uneven economic development of these areas also means that the Han people cannot do without the cooperation and support of the minority nationalities, and the minority nationalities cannot do without the support and help of the Han race. The distribution of nationalities and the distribution of resources in the country creates a greater objective basis for the idea of the "two inseparables."

The foregoing shows that the idea of the "two inseparables" has both an ample Marxist basis and a foundation in a large quantity of irrefutable facts. It is both consistent with actual relationships among the country's nationalities, and also in keeping with the fundamental common interests of the country's various nationalities. Consequently, it is a major guiding idea for our correct study and handling of relationships among nationalities. For the people of various nationalities throughout the country, it is no "yoke" by any means; it only acts as a brake that prevents fanning the flames of splittism, and it is a powerful weapon for the prevention of great Han chauvinism and local nationalism.

5. Is the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region the Only Autonomous Area for the Uygurs?

China's use of the national areas autonomy system is the only correct system for solving the country's nationalities problem, and it is also an important political system for the country. National areas autonomy is under centralized state leadership, each of the minority nationality communities having area autonomy, setting up autonomous agencies, and exercising autonomous authority. China's national area autonomy is a proper combination of national autonomy and regional autonomy; it is national autonomy within a certain area. A departure from regional autonomy or a departure from national autonomy would be a departure from the principle of an autonomous system for the country's ethnic areas.

Most of the country's national autonomy areas are autonomous for one particular minority people for the most part, but within each autonomous area, many nationalities live together in varying numbers, and in any given autonomous area in which a single nationality is predominant, there is no other minority national autonomous area at the same level (autonomous zhou, autonomous county, or autonomous township). This situation is also the result of the peculiarities of nationality distribution in China. Consequently, local autonomy for the country's nationalities is not purely autonomy for any given nationality, and national autonomous areas are likewise not purely autonomous areas for any

given nationality. Some people suppose that the "Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is the only autonomous area for the Uygurs," but such a construction is incorrect, and violates the principles of the country's national areas autonomous system. The reasons are as follows: First, China's ethnic region autonomy is based on minority nationality communities. It is in such places that national autonomous areas are set up and regional autonomy instituted. This is not purely ethnic autonomy, nor is it purely regional autonomy; it is the correct combination of ethnic autonomy and regional autonomy. To suppose that Xinjiang is only an autonomous area for the Uygurs is to emphasize only the ethnic autonomy aspect while forgetting the existence of regional autonomy at the same time. Thus, it violates the principle of the country's ethnic area autonomy system.

Second, autonomy in the country's ethnic areas is a multilevel, multiform autonomy as a result of the distinctive features of the country's ethnic relations and ethnic distribution. Xinjiang is a multinational area in which the Uygurs are autonomous, and in which the Kazak, the Hui, the Mongolian, the Kirgiz, the Xibe, and the Tajik nationalities all are autonomous. Since the Uygur nationality population accounts for the majority of the minority nationality population in Xinjiang, the Xinjiang autonomous area is named after the Uygurs, but there are no autonomous areas for other minority peoples at the same time. Thus, the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region is a multinational autonomous area in which the Uygurs are predominant; and it is an autonomous region in which nationalities cooperate, and not a single nationality autonomous region. The belief that Xinjiang is only an autonomous area for the Uygurs runs contrary to the the country's ethnic areas autonomy system.

Third, the essence of China's ethnic region autonomy is to have within the unified multinational socialist motherland family a certain number of minority nationality communities in which the local people themselves are the masters and have authority to run their own internal affairs. In the multinational Xinjiang region, we have to both ensure the right to autonomy of every nationality, and also ensure the equal rights of other nationalities. This is the only way in which all nationalities can be better united, and the enthusiasm of all nationalities for the building of socialism can be stirred to promote the development and prosperity of all nationalities, and to consolidate the oneness of the motherland and the unity of all nationalities.

6. With Reform and Opening to the Outside World Will the Minority Nationalities Face the Danger of Assimilation?

This is an important period of reform and opening to the outside world for China in which both the development of the country and the joint prosperity of all nationalities

is inseparable from the historical tide and the social environment. This positively will not create a danger of assimilation for the minority nationalities.

We know that reform means socialism's eradication of the old system that did not fit in with needs in development of productivity and the creation of a new system, thereby enabling both production relationships and the superstructure to improve themselves constantly. Opening to the outside world means socialism's steady assimilation of the accomplishments of human civilization from history and present day life to enrich and develop ourselves rather than to wall ourselves off. This is an essential requirement in the development of socialism. Since the 3d plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee, the party has adhered to a fundamental policy of reform and opening to the outside world which has resulted in an unprecedented period of development. As the basic element in social development, peoples of various nationalities are bound to be affected by social development and change. Marx and Engels noted that the basic agents in the development of a people are "their production and the extent to which they develop internal and external contacts." This is to say that the development of productivity and the amount of assimilation of knowledge from the outside world are decisive. One has to realize that all nationalities have developed tremendously since founding of the People's Republic of China; nevertheless, all nationalities remain at a low level of development in the initial stage of socialism. The level of development of productivity is generally backward; the commodity economy is not developed; and culture and education are unevenly developed. Take Xinjiang, for example. Statistics for 1986 showed the gross output value of Xinjiang industry to be 9 percent lower than for the country as a whole, the rural commodity rate to be 10 percent lower than for the country as a whole; and the labor productivity rate for all personnel in enterprises covered by the budget to be only 76 percent that of the country as a whole. Per capita industrial and agricultural output value was 300 yuan less than for the country as a whole as of 1987. Statistics for 1982 showed with respect to Xinjiang's minority nationality population that college, senior middle school, and junior middle school education figures were 50 percent, 42 percent, and 36.5 percent lower per 1,000 people than for the country as a whole. This state of affairs is the result of not only historical reasons and natural environmental factors, but also the old system under which minority nationality areas stalled for a long time between a natural economy and product economy, were relatively isolated, and did not shape a dynamic mechanism for social development. Therefore, only reform of the old system, development of a commodity economy, and introduction of the competition mechanism can give impetus to development of minority nationality areas. Likewise, only further opening to the outside world, steady assimilation of all of the fine foreign and domestic accomplishments of civilization under a larger social system, and the shaping, at a new intersection point in

civilization, of a trend whereby there can be no reversal in the development of productivity can the course of minority nationalities development be shortened, and a leap in development be realized.

Therefore, in the course of reform and opening to the outside world, each minority nationality will see full development and a strengthening of its vitality rather than assimilation. Certainly, during the socialist period, every nationality will not only develop to the full, but will also strengthen commonality. This is a historical development process of dialectical unity. This strengthening of commonality among nationalities will not necessarily lead to assimilation among nationalities. This is because there will also be full development of nationalities during this process that will imbue every nationality with more powerful vitality. Racial assimilation is an extremely complex historical phenomenon. Historically, there have indeed been instances in which force or advanced production methods have triumphed over backward production methods enabling the assimilation of some peoples. At such times, usually some complex circumstances and conditions played a role. Today, however, when socialism has long since eradicated racial oppression, coercive assimilation policies cannot be instituted. Reform and opening to the outside world is for the purpose of changing the backwardness of the minority nationalities to enable their full political, economic, and cultural development, to make them richer and more varied, to better preserve their youth, and to bring about a process in which all nationalities prosper in common. Today, the gap in development between eastern and western parts of the country has widened with new imbalances occurring. Nevertheless, we believe that full development of reform and opening to the outside world is bound to promote the rapid development of every minority nationality enabling them to catch up directly with the level of development of advanced nationalities. Were we to stick to the isolation of the past, our nationalities would lose their vitality.

7. What Effect Do Ethnic Majority Chauvinism and Ethnic Minority Chauvinism Have On Each Other?

Bourgeois nationalism is a social ideology that took shape under the exploitation system. It stems from an ultra-narrow point of view that excludes nationalities other than one's own, regards the interest of one's own nationality as being supreme, and disregards, or even denies the common fundamental interests of the people of all nationalities. In China, bourgeois nationalism is manifested primarily in the two mistaken ideological tendencies of ethnic majority chauvinism, and ethnic minority chauvinism. The spread and development of these two mistaken ideological tendencies leads inevitably to national prejudices and national divisions. Our party has historically persisted in opposition to bourgeois nationalism, has opposed ethnic majority chauvinism, and has also opposed ethnic minority chauvinism. Opposition to the two kinds of nationalism during the period of socialism in China should, generally speaking,

emphasize opposition to ethnic majority chauvinism (primarily Han chauvinism). Because reactionary rulers (primarily Han rulers) historically rode roughshod over minority nationalities, and created all sorts of misunderstandings among all nationalities, it is difficult to completely eradicate the effects within a short period of time. Consequently, in the handling of domestic racial relations, our party emphasizes prevention and opposes Han chauvinism. It regards this as the key in doing a good job of uniting nationalities. However, we also have to realize the objective existence of local nationalism, and we must resolutely oppose it. In Xinjiang Province, in particular, when all nationalities are currently concentrating their energies on modernization, an extremely small minority is engaged in divisive activities. They are raising the East Turkistan banner to preach Xinjiang independence, thereby damaging the unity of the motherland. We must exercise a high degree of vigilance against the perils of such national splitism. We must take a clear stand in resolute opposition to it.

Though bourgeois nationalism is manifested in different ways, it stems from a single ideology, and its mutual effects are reflected primarily in the following several ways: First, ethnic majority chauvinism and ethnic minority chauvinism are a reflection of bourgeois and other exploiting class ideologies in race relations. In China, ethnic majority chauvinism is manifested primarily in an attitude of inequality toward minority nationalities, prejudice against minority nationalities, and separation from minority nationalities. Ethnic minority chauvinism is manifested primarily in the maintenance of exclusivity, self-isolation, disregard for the overall interests of the country, and disregard for the importance of help from the Han nationality. These two kinds of nationalism can be manifested simultaneously in a single person. A person may express ethnic minority chauvinism toward a nationality having a large population that is more advanced than his own, while at the same time expressing ethnic majority chauvinism toward minority nationalities more backward than one's own. Clearly, the two are interlinked.

Second, a feature common to both ethnic majority chauvinism and ethnic minority chauvinism is disregard for the importance of equality, unity, and mutual assistance and cooperation among all nationalities, and the inability to apply the principles of equality, unity, and mutual assistance and cooperation in dealing with various problems among all nationalities within the large family of the motherland. The result is the manifestation, in a concentrated way, of mutual antagonisms, and failure to see an interdependent relationship. Thus, neither ethnic majority chauvinism nor ethnic minority chauvinism is beneficial for national unity and socialist modernization, or for the development and prosperity of one's own nationality. It impairs the country's normal social stability, and its economic and cultural development.

Third, whenever either the ideological trend of ethnic majority chauvinism or the ideological trend of ethnic

minority chauvinism runs rampant, the results are disastrous. When ethnic majority chauvinism runs rampant, it creates race prejudice and racial oppression, and it creates new racial inequality. When ethnic minority chauvinism runs rampant, it creates racial divisions, turmoil in nationality areas, and threatens the unity of the motherland. Both ethnic majority chauvinism and ethnic minority chauvinism may be used by class enemies inside and outside of China for the purpose of sowing dissension among various nationalities, damaging national unity, and splitting the unity of the motherland. For this reason, during China's new period of reform and opening to the outside world, the strengthening of national unity, and socialist modernization require that we resolutely oppose ethnic majority chauvinism, and simultaneously resolutely oppose ethnic minority chauvinism.

Ethnic majority chauvinism and ethnic minority chauvinism in China often find expression not only in minority problems, but also in contradictions among the people that fit into the category of problems of ideological understanding. Democratic methods, the method of reasoning things out, and criticism and self-criticism should be used to solve this problem. However, efforts by an extremely small number of people to use bourgeois nationalism in an effort to divide the motherland and disrupt unity among the various nationalities must be thoroughly exposed, resolutely attacked, and punished according to law in order to maintain the unity of all nationalities and national unity, as well as to ensure victorious progress in the building of the four modernizations.

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8. Does the Enrollment of Cadres on the Basis of Percentages for Members of the Han Nationality and Minority Nationalities Constitute Equality?

The constitutional provision for equality of all nationalities means that all nationalities are politically equal. In other words, citizens have equal political freedoms such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, travel, and demonstration; citizens are equal in their right to elect or to be elected; and citizens have equality in freedom of person, freedom of religious belief, and social, economic, and welfare rights. This means that citizens of all nationalities are the same.

In Xinjiang, the enrollment of students and cadres on the basis of a percentage of members of the Han nationality and minority nationalities does not conflict with the constitutional provision for the equality of all races. One must acknowledge that, for historical reasons, an economic, cultural and living standards gap exists among various nationalities. Some nationalities are fairly advanced, and some nationalities lag behind. Our task is to erase these imbalances as quickly as possible, enabling the nationalities that lag behind to catch up, thereby attaining the goal of all nationalities developing and prospering in common.

Article 116 of the constitution provides: "People's congresses in national autonomous areas have the authority to draw up autonomous regulations and separate regulations in accordance with the political, economic, and cultural characteristics of local nationalities." Article 4 of the ethnic region autonomy law provides: Autonomous organizations in autonomous nationality areas exercise the local national organization powers provided for in Section 5, Chapter 3 of the Constitution. They also exercise authority in accordance with limitations set forth in the Constitution, in this law, and other laws, implementing national laws and policies in accordance with locally prevailing circumstances. "Both the Constitution and the ethnic regions autonomy law confer upon autonomous regions the power to formulate economic, cultural, and financial regulations in keeping with local nationality and local region development on the basis of prevailing circumstances so long as they do not contravene, in principle, either the Constitution or the autonomy law. The autonomy law also provides explicitly that large numbers of minority nationality cadres at all levels, and all kinds of specialists and technical workers must be trained. This is a basic requirement for development of the economy and culture of minority areas. In the absence of this requirement, it would be very difficult for minority nationality areas to escape from poverty and backwardness and vault into the ranks of advanced nationalities. What is to be done when we feel sometimes that there is insufficient talent, and that the quality of people is not high? We believe that needs should be satisfied first, and then the quality of personnel improved."

Since founding of the People's Republic of China, the country's institutions of higher learning and secondary technical schools have long accorded "priority admission for equal grades" to minority nationality students sitting for examination, or they have "suitably liberalized grades for admission." In 1980 a policy was first instituted with regard to minority nationality students sitting for examinations in minority nationality communities in Xinjiang, mountain regions, and pastoral areas whereby grade requirements for acceptance were lowered in view of prevailing local conditions. In addition, minority nationality students scattered in Han nationality areas sitting for examinations were also given priority for admission when they had the same grades as Han nationality students sitting for examinations. In accordance with the spirit of the document titled, "Views on the Improvement of Nationalities Education Work" from the State Nationalities Affairs Commission and the former Ministry of Education, in the enrollment of students, some institutions of higher education and secondary technical schools under autonomous nationality areas jurisdiction enforce a policy giving priority to the admittance of students from minority nationalities sitting for examinations, and prescribe a percentage quota for them. In 1985, the State Education Commission promulgated "Temporary Regulations for the Enrollment of Students in Ordinary Institutions of Higher Education," which explicitly provides for an

appropriate lowering of grade requirements for admission of minority nationality students sitting for examinations. In July of the same year, a document from the education commission in our district provided that all students of the Uygur, Kazak, Mongolian, Kirgiz, Tajik, Xibe, Uzbek, Tatar, Daur, Tibetan, and Russian nationalities sitting for the standard Han language examination should be given consideration according to their separate circumstances at the time of admission. In addition, suitable consideration should be accorded to Hui nationality students sitting for examination and to predetermined student enrollments, as well as to students from border areas assigned for training.

Some people feel these various kinds of consideration are unequal, but we feel such a view to be invalid. First of all, one must realize that such consideration is based in law, and is in keeping with the Constitution and provisions of nationality area autonomy regulations. Second, one must realize the difference and the inequality in economic and cultural development of various nationalities. One cannot "act with arbitrary uniformity"; instead one should pose workable requirements on the basis of different circumstances. Development of nationalities education must be done with regard for realities in nationalities areas; one cannot be divorced from realities in nationalities areas, blindly copying the methods of advanced areas. We must both observe the rules common to all education, and also bear in mind the distinctive features of national autonomous regions, strive for results, train more talent for ethnic areas, and train talent rapidly. One must also realize that these are simply proper considerations and not unprincipled considerations, much less unconditional considerations. When too much consideration is given, it becomes impossible to ensure quality of personnel, and this hurts development of a people's economy and culture.

Still other people regard such considerations as natural and as matters of course. Such a perception is also wrong. I believe that suitable lowering of the admission grade line is a transitional measure that has as its goal hastening the development of education in autonomous nationality areas. By the same reasoning, the admission by examination of certain percentages of members of the Han nationality and minority nationalities as cadres is a consideration accorded minority nationalities. Unless this is done, indigenous cadres in autonomous nationality areas will become fewer and fewer, and this will be bad for good performance of the various kinds of work in autonomous nationality regions, as well as not in keeping with the constitution and the nationality areas autonomy law. As the economy and culture of autonomous nationality areas develops, and large numbers of indigenous cadres are trained, these considerations will become unnecessary.

9. What Is the Effect on Nationality Issues of "Leftist" and "Rightist" Ideology? How Is It Expressed in the New Era?

Because "leftist" ideology is ahead of the stage of development of things in a perceptual sense, and since it

recognizes the commonality of things to the neglect of their particularity, when expressed in terms of nationalities issues it neglects the equal rights and right to autonomy of nationalities having small populations, neglects the important role of minority nationalities in revolution and construction, and neglects the distinctive features of minority nationalities, mechanically applying the experiences of the majority nationality, acting with "arbitrary uniformity," and running things all alone without consulting others. It ignores or does not care about the suffering of the minority nationalities, or even encroaches upon their interests; and it does not respect the spoken language, writing, habits, or customs of the minority nationalities. Since "rightist" ideology lags behind the stage of development of things in a perceptual sense, it looks only at the particularity of things to the neglect of their commonality. When applied to nationalities issues, this outlook is expressed in the following ways: overemphasis on the distinctive features of nationalities to the neglect of the extreme importance of the unity of nationalities in the great family of the motherland; looking only at the temporary and partial interests of minority nationalities, while neglecting both the overall interests of the state and the long-range interests of nationalities; accommodating to, or even admiring, the narrowness and backwardness of some minority nationalities, while neglecting or even opposing mutual intercourse and mutual support among all nationalities, etc.

Although "leftist" and "rightist" ideology find different concrete expression on nationalities issues, the ideological methods and the negative role of both is the same and, under certain circumstances, they are interchangeable. In both, theory is divorced from practice, and the subjective is divided from the objective. They both run counter to the party's correct theories and policies; they both adversely affect the consolidation and development of equality, unity, and mutual assistance among all nationalities; and they damage the smooth advance of the revolution and construction.

For a long time after 1957, "leftist" guiding ideology seriously interfered with the party's correct theories and policies with regard to nationalities issues.

In the suppression of rebellion in some minority nationality areas, and in the course of reforming feudal oppression and the exploitative system of Lamaism and Islam during the campaign to oppose local nationalist chauvinism of 1957 and 1958, widespread mistakes were made that accidentally hurt some nationalities' cadres and religious personages. Numerous minority nationality areas did not act on the basis of existing realities; instead, as in Han nationality areas, their rush to build people's communes resulted in production relationships that did not fit the level of development of productivity, and thus they interfered with the development of production. After 1958, the prevailing trend was toward the melding of nationalities in which the distinctive characteristics of individual nationalities, national forms, and the right to autonomy of minority nationalities were not

accorded the respect they deserved. During the 10 years of the "Great Cultural Revolution," in particular, the Lin Biao and the Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques pushed "leftist" mistakes to an extreme out of ulterior motives. They repudiated completely the correct nationalities theories and nationalities policies that the party had pursued since founding of the People's Republic; they repudiated the magnificent achievements made in nationalities work; they denied that racial problems still existed during the socialist period; and they applied class struggle to the handling and settlement of nationalities issues, which produced a serious catastrophe for nationalities work and for the people of all nationalities throughout the country. This extremely abnormal situation was not basically corrected until after the smashing of the "gang of four," and particularly after the 3d plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee.

Following the 3d plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee, the party re-established a Marxist ideological line, political line, and organizational line, bringing order out of chaos, and restoring, reaffirming, and developing the party's correct nationalities theories and nationalities policies. Nevertheless, for longstanding historical, social, and cognitive reasons, the bad effects of erroneous ideology, both "leftist" and "rightist", continued to be expressed in many ways during the new historical period. (1) It was forgotten that nationalities problems are a part of overall problems in the building of socialism, and there was failure to understand that the party's basic line during the preliminary stage of socialism is to guide our victorious completion of all nationality work tasks, and to develop a great program for relations among nationalities under socialism. Supposing that the development of nationalities work could be done, and solutions to nationalities problems found without reference to the overall mission and overall policies of the party and the state, the special nature of nationalities issues was exaggerated, and onesided emphasis was placed on partial, immediate interests. Alternatively, on the supposition that the building of the economy should take precedence over everything else, the importance of actively launching nationalities work, and correctly solving nationalities issues was disregarded. There was no conscientious implementation of the party's nationalities policies, and no study and propagandizing of the party's nationalities theories. (2) There was a failure to understand the complexity and long-term nature of the nationalities problem, and it was supposed that the exploiting class had been wiped out and that all was well with the world. Necessary political ideological work was abandoned, and words and deeds damaging to the unity of nationalities were paid no heed, but allowed to grow and spread unchecked. Possibly, there was no firm confidence in the innate character and essential aspects of unity among the country's nationalities. A little trouble one place caused panic as though big trouble was about to happen everywhere. (3) There was a proclivity toward simplifying complex problems. There were some major political problems that clearly split the integrity of the motherland and damaged the unity of

nationalities, but it was insisted that these problems were in the nature of ideological understanding problems among the people, and neither diligent investigation nor stern handling was approved. At the same time, there was also a tendency to make simple problems complex. Civil quarrels involving two or several people were blown up into problems between nationalities simply because different nationalities were involved. (4) Theories and policies that practice had already shown to be correct were repudiated under the guise of emancipating thinking and reforming and opening to the outside world, or else the ideological weapon of the "two inseparables," which guided our safeguarding the equality and unity of nationalities, was termed a "yoke" that shackled people's spirit. (5) There was failure to recognize that bourgeois nationalism was a corrosive agent for the equality and unity of nationalities. The dialectical relationship between opposing bourgeois nationalism and safeguarding the unity of the integrity of the motherland, and the unity of nationalities was not understood, or it was supposed that safeguarding of the unity of nationalities meant no criticism of bourgeois nationalism. Alternatively, it was supposed that criticism of bourgeois nationalism might be a departure from the common goal of realizing socialist modernization. (6) There was failure to understand that Han chauvinism and local nationality chauvinism are both bourgeois nationalism, and that both are exploitative class social ideologies that hurt the integrity of the country and the unity of nationalities. Both should be criticized and corrected. Alternatively, only opposition to Han chauvinism was approved, but opposition to local nationality chauvinism was not approved. In other cases, only opposition to local nationality chauvinism was approved, but opposition to Han chauvinism was disapproved. (7) There was a failure to understand that reform and opening to the outside world was for the purpose of guiding people of all races in the country in taking the avenue leading toward development of common prosperity. On the pretext of safeguarding distinctive ethnic characteristics, reform and opening to the outside world were disapproved. Alternatively, there was a failure to understand that reform and opening to the outside world had to be done on the basis of realities and by suiting general methods to specific circumstances. Instead it was applied mechanically on the basis of experiences elsewhere in the practice of "arbitrary uniformity," without regard for distinctions among nationalities. (8) The equal political status, and the identity of fundamental interests of all nationalities was disregarded, and overemphasis was placed on economic and cultural differences, the equality of nationalities and the unity of nationalities being pitted against each other. Alternatively, only the political equality and identity of fundamental interests of all nationalities were acknowledged, while economic and cultural differences among different nationalities were ignored, the necessity for special preferential policies in minority nationality areas and among minority nationalities being repudiated. These situations tell us that implementation of the

correct nationalities theories and policies formulated in the wake of the 3d plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee will require continuation of struggle on two fronts.

10. What Is the Content of Marxist Nationalities Theories and Party Nationalities Policies?

Marxist nationality theories are a science for the study of nationalities and the laws of development of nationalities problems. They are an important integral part of scientific socialism, and they are the theoretical foundation for proletarian political party formulation of nationalities policies. Marxist nationality theories are extremely rich in content. Their basic principles encompass the following five things:

First is a scientific delineation of the laws that shape, develop, and cause the withering away of nationalities. Marx and Engels applied dialectic materialism to the study of society, nationalities, and colonies, and in the process of creating a scientific socialist doctrine, they noted explicitly that a nationality is the product of a certain stage of a society's development, that it grows out of clans, tribes, and alliances of tribes, and it will disappear as national differences wither away in communist society. This places nationality theories on the foundation of the materialist concept of history.

Second, they note that the private ownership system is the source of national oppression and national exploitation. Complete solution to nationalities problems requires annihilation of the exploitative system. "Once man's exploitation of man has been wiped out, one nationality's exploitation of another nationality's will be wiped out along with it." "Once class antagonisms within a nationality disappear, hostile relations among nationalities will disappear along with them."³ This links the solution to nationalities issues with the winning of victory in the socialist revolution.

Third is an elucidation of proletarian internationalist principles. Capitalist oppression, exploitation, and pillaging are international in nature, and are an international force. Proletarians "should employ the fraternal alliance of all nationalities to resist the fraternal bourgeois alliance of all nationalities."⁴

Fourth is the proof that the the proletarian revolution and the struggle to liberate the oppressed nationalities are interdependent. The victory of the proletarian revolution is a signal that all oppressed peoples have been liberated, and the national liberation movement is the best ally of the proletarian revolution.

Fifth is validation of the first principle of the equality, self-determination and alliance of all nationalities. Marx wrote: "A prerequisite to the liberation of the British

working class is the transformation of the existing compulsory merger, namely the enslavement of Ireland, into a free and equal alliance, if possible, or complete separation, if necessary."⁵

The party's nationalities policy is a major political program, the main line, and an important part of the policy of our party and state. The party's nationalities policy consists primarily of the following eight components: (1) A policy of safeguarding the integrity of the motherland and maintaining national equality, national unity, and the common prosperity of all nationalities. By this is meant maintenance of the equality of all nationalities no matter how large or how small, and no matter whether socially advanced or backward, and opposing prejudice against and oppression of all nationalities; strengthening of national unity, opposing conduct that damages national unity and that drives a wedge between nationalities. Safeguarding of the integrity of the motherland and supporting national equality is the basic work plan and basic policy of the party's and state's nationalities work. (2) Nationalities regional autonomy policy. By this is meant the exercise, under centralized national leadership, of regional autonomy for all minority nationality communities, with the establishment of autonomous government agencies to exercise autonomous rights. (3) A policy of helping all minority nationality areas develop their economy and culture, the state providing vigorous support and assistance to nationality areas in the form of intellectual, material, and financial resources. (4) A policy of training minority nationality cadres. By this is meant active training of minority nationality cadres, specialized personnel of all kinds, and technical workers. (5) A policy of respect for the spoken and written language of minority peoples, insuring that all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written language. (6) A policy of respect for the customs and habits of minority nationalities, ensuring that all nationalities have freedom to maintain or reform their own customs and habits. (7) A policy of guaranteeing freedom of religious belief to citizens of all nationalities. (8) A party united front policy toward ranking patriots in minority nationalities.

The basic spirit of the foregoing eight nationalities policies of the party is advocacy of and support for the "equality," "unity," "progress," "development," and "prosperity" of all nationalities. Practice since founding of the People's Republic has repeatedly shown the party's nationalities policy as both supporting and developing Marxist-Leninist nationality policy, and being in keeping with the objective realities of Chinese nationality issues, reflecting the fundamental interests of the country and all nationalities.

11. What Is the Correlation Between Nationalization and Communization?

In accordance with the country's ethnic realities, both the party and the state carry out a system of national regional autonomy in places where there is a fairly

concentrated community of minority nationalities. This is a party and state political system that has as its goal insuring that people of minority nationality races are able fully to exercise their rights as masters in their own house.

By nationalization is meant the nationalization of autonomous agencies in autonomous places enjoying national area autonomy. The nationalization of autonomous agencies is the reflection in autonomous agencies of the characteristics of autonomous nationalities. It consists mostly of the use of ethnic cadres, ethnic spoken and written languages, and ethnic methods in the administration of the local nationality and matters within the local area as the nationality sees fit. Use of local nationality cadres is crucial to the nationalization of autonomous agencies. This is because only when autonomous agencies have local nationality cadres is it possible to use the minority spoken and written language, and to apply in every way the national forms that the nationality loves to see and hear, the nationality's autonomous authority thereby achieving respect and development, and being fully exercised. This is also the only way to assure development of the economy and culture of autonomous nationality areas, and to strengthen national unity.

Autonomous nationality areas are a primary level political power in China that must accept the leadership of the party and the state. The nationalization of autonomous agencies is not for the purpose of getting rid of party and state leadership; rather it is for the purpose of better insuring party and state leadership of national autonomous areas through outstanding minority nationality cadres with a level of communist ideology, and to ensure implementation in minority nationality areas of the party's line, plans, and policies. Therefore, we must have a correct understanding of the correlation between nationalization and communization.

First, communization is the foundation and the prerequisite for nationalization. This is to say that the prerequisite for nationalization must be communization. This is because our party is the vanguard of the working class, the faithful representative of the interests of people of all nationalities, and the leadership nucleus of the socialist cause. The ultimate goal of the party is to realize a communist social system. This requires that party cadres possess a high Marxist theoretical level, maintain a high degree of political unanimity with the party, persevere in putting the interests of the party and the people above everything, subordinate personal interests to the interests of the party and the people, subordinate the interests of a nationality to the interests of all nationalities, serve the people of all nationalities wholeheartedly, uphold the unity and integrity of the country, uphold the unity and integrity of all nationalities, and consciously struggle for the communist cause. This requires that every ethnic cadre first possess these requisites in order to qualify to become a leading cadre in national autonomous area

autonomous agencies, and in order to be able to serve wholeheartedly the people of all nationalities and the people of his or her own nationality.

Second, nationalization is a necessary requirement for the realization of communization. The lofty communist cause is embodied in the concrete acts we perform in daily life. All the party's plans and policies must rely on our cadres at every level directly contacting and working with the masses. In national autonomous areas, cadres of all nationalities have to be depended upon, and it is only through them that it is possible to implement the party's plans and policies among the minority nationalities. Without minority nationality cadres, the party's contact with the minority nationalities will be broken, and the smooth implementation of the party's plans and policies among the minority nationalities will become impossible. This is because with the nationalization of cadres, minority nationality cadres are more familiar than Han nationality cadres with the history and present condition of their own nationality, their way of life and their customs and habits, and the geographical environment and natural resources. They are versed in the language of their own nationality, and they can readily understand and report the needs of the people of their own nationality. Thus, they can more effectively handle the role and the influence of their own distinctive national consciousness, national way of life, religious beliefs, national relations, and such non-economic factors in the modernization process. In the process of implementing the party's nationality policies, autonomous area modernization, outstanding minority nationality cadres can safeguard the interests of the minority nationality masses, respect their feelings, and better mobilize and stimulate the enthusiasm of minority nationality people in order to ensure party and state leadership, and to ensure the implementation among the minority nationalities of the party's line, plans, and policies.

Finally, nationalization and communization are intertwined. In the modernization of national autonomous areas, cadres of all nationalities must uphold the leadership of the party, and take the socialist road to work for the interests of the people of all nationalities in autonomous areas. This means that nationalization cannot deviate from communization. In addition, we also have to realize that modernization cannot depart from struggling together with the people of minority nationalities or from making concerted efforts with the people of minority nationalities. This means that the communization of national autonomous areas can only be realized through nationalization. Therefore, adherence to the oneness of nationalization and communization is in keeping with the principles underlying the country's nationality areas autonomy system. We cannot abandon communization because of emphasis on nationalization, nor can we not have nationalization because of emphasis on communization.

12. Will Further Opening to the Outside World of Minority Nationality Areas Lead to the Disappearance of Ethnic Culture?

All of China's nationalities have a superb cultural tradition; however, they are facing problems as a result of the opening to the outside world in order to develop and modernize. Fears lest the further opening to the outside world of minority nationality areas may lead to the disappearance of ethnic cultures reflect a rather narrow and conservative psychology toward the development of ethnic culture.

Ever since there have been nationalities, culture has had an ethnic character that imbues it with distinctive ethnic features, ethnic forms, and ethnic style. Ever since ancient times, there has never been a people without a culture, and there has never been a culture without distinctive ethnic characteristics. Looked at in terms of the development of ethnic culture, the culture of every people is determined by changes in its economic base, by the people's cultural creations and by the absorption of different culture from other peoples under certain environmental conditions. The present opening and development of all minority nationality areas is required by, and is the outcome of the pervasive development of reform, and economic diversification primarily under a system of public ownership, and development of a commodity economy. This assaults and changes the natural economy, and the seminatural economy, as well as the old system in minority nationality areas. Sooner or later, these changes are bound to be reflected in the development of the people's culture, a new culture with a distinctive character being steadily created. In addition, it also enables the culture of minority nationalities both to spread throughout the country and even the world, and also to absorb the superb cultural accomplishments of a different character from other peoples and countries for their own modernization. Therefore, opening outward for development is both an opportunity for, and a challenge to the cultural development of the minority nationalities. Only by seizing the opportunity, meeting the challenge, not withdrawing, and taking the modernization road can the ethnic cultures retain their youth. One has to realize that the distinctive features of a people's culture is a product of history. Modernization and opening to the outside world do not wipe out the distinctive features of a people's culture because in the development of a people's culture, "each stage encounters a certain material result, and the sum of a certain amount of productivity." The historical relationship formed between people and nature, as well as between people and people encounter a large amount of productivity, capital, and an environment passed to the next generation by the previous generation. Even though this productivity, capital, and environment is changed by the new generation, at the same time, it prescribes in advance the living conditions of the new generation imbuing it with a certain development and a distinctive character. Therefore, the development of every people's culture is distinctive. This is even truer of China's

minority nationalities and their culture, which have a long history and tradition. What they are facing today is nothing more than modernization problems and not problems of withering away. As far as the people are concerned, they are part of history, and today is far from the time for them to wither away. So long as a people exists, the people's culture expresses the people's attributes in a certain sense, becoming a cultural indicator that separates one people from another.

In all times and in all countries, the mutual assimilation of culture among different peoples, the opening outward for development, and mutual exchanges have been a trend of historical development. In China, the culture of the Han nationality developed out of a fusion of Chinese culture with the culture of the barbarians to the east and north, the absorption of Indian culture, and the culture of western areas and the Khitans, Mongolian and Arab culture, as well as occidental Christian culture. The culture of all the minority nationalities also developed out of mutual assimilation and fusion with Han culture as well as foreign cultures. These openings to the outside and mutual assimilation of culture have by no means extinguished national cultures, but rather have made the culture of all nationalities richer and more varied. In recent times, large scale industrial production methods have made it difficult for natural economies and cultures cut off from the world to survive. Mutual contacts by all types of cultures across national boundaries have

become a universal phenomenon. All types of cultures are in the process of fusing and dividing through a process of opening to the outside world, clashing, and selection. The culture of all nationalities has encountered unprecedented conditions and a climate for development. To be isolated means to be backward; cultures that reject cultural selection, opening to the outside world and absorption of culture from the outside are headed for decline. Therefore, reform and opening to the outside world offer a fine opportunity for the cultures of all nationalities to take the road to modernization by changing the foundation and structure for their development through the assimilation of the superb cultural achievements of different cultures.

Footnotes

1. *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol 1, p 264.
2. Lenin, "Further Discussion of Distinctions On the Basis of Race," in *Complete Works of Lenin*, Vol 19, p 554.
3. *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol 1, p 270.
4. *Ibid.*, pp 289-290, which also puts forward the battle slogan, "Proletarians of the World, Unite."
5. *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol 2, p 312.